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LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOLARSHIP AND  
SUPREME COURT ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE, 1950–2010 
by 
Camden Hutchison* 
Although law and economics has influenced nearly every area of Ameri-
can law, few have been as deeply and as thoroughly “economized” as an-
titrust. Beginning in the 1970s, antitrust law—traditionally informed 
by populist hostility to economic concentration—was dramatically trans-
formed by a new and overriding focus on economic efficiency. This trans-
formation was associated with a provocative new wave of antitrust 
scholarship, which claimed that economic efficiency (or “consumer wel-
fare”) was the sole legitimate aim of antitrust policy. The U.S. Supreme 
Court seemingly agreed, issuing decision after decision rejecting tradi-
tional antitrust values and adopting the efficiency norm of the law and 
economics movement. By century’s end, the populist origins of antitrust 
had faded into memory, and the professional discourse of the antitrust 
community (scholars, practitioners, and judges) had become dominated 
by economic analysis. 
Although this transformation in antitrust law has been the subject of 
considerable academic commentary, its causes remain poorly understood. 
Many scholars assume, sometimes tacitly, that the economic analysis of 
law and economics scholarship had a direct, educative influence on the 
Supreme Court. Other scholars argue that changes in the Court’s anti-
trust jurisprudence were merely a reflection of changes in its composition, 
specifically the conservative appointments of the Nixon administration. 
What these opposing interpretations share in common is their limited ev-
identiary basis—both are derived from impressionistic reviews of a select 
number of Supreme Court decisions, rather than systematic analysis of 
larger historical trends. 
This Article moves beyond previous scholarship by presenting a compre-
hensive, quantitative study of every Supreme Court antitrust case from 
1950 to 2010, a period including the decades before, during, and after 
the economic turn in antitrust. This comprehensive approach allows for 
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more generalized conclusions regarding the real-world influence of law 
and economics scholarship. Based on both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence, this Article concludes that the Nixon appointments of the late 
1960s and early 1970s were the primary cause of changes in antitrust 
jurisprudence, but that academic developments have infused these 
changes with an intellectual legitimacy they might otherwise have lacked, 
broadening their appeal and effectively insulating them from future 
changes in the composition of the Court. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Law and economics—the application of economic theory to legal 
analysis—is widely considered among the most influential developments 
in legal scholarship of the past half-century. And while the law and eco-
nomics movement has influenced nearly every area of American law 
(from corporate governance to family relations, and from contracts to 
the Constitution), few have been as deeply and as thoroughly “econo-
mized” as antitrust. Beginning in the 1970s, antitrust law—traditionally 
informed by populist hostility to economic concentration—was dramati-
cally transformed by a new and overriding focus on economic efficiency. 
This transformation was inspired by a provocative new wave of antitrust 
scholarship, which argued that economic efficiency (or “consumer wel-
fare”) was the sole legitimate aim of antitrust policy.
1
 Much of this schol-
arship criticized traditional, populist antitrust jurisprudence as ideologi-
cally biased, doctrinally incoherent, and (worst of all) harmful to the 
American economy.
2 
Armed with the analytical tools of neoclassical price 
theory, many scholars instead advocated a market-based approach to an-
titrust law, skeptical of the benefits of active government intervention. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court—arguably the most 
powerful institution in shaping U.S. antitrust policy—seemed to embrace 
this view, handing down decision after decision rejecting traditional anti-
trust values and adopting the efficiency norm of the law and economics 
movement. By century’s end, the populist origins of antitrust had faded 
into memory, and the professional discourse of the antitrust community 
(scholars, practitioners, and judges) had become dominated by econom-
ic analysis. Not coincidentally—and for better or for worse—the scope 
and vigor of antitrust enforcement had also significantly diminished. 
Although this transformation in antitrust law has been the subject of 
extensive academic commentary, its causes remain poorly understood. 
There is broad consensus in the antitrust literature that economics has 
 
1
This scholarship has traditionally been associated with the University of 
Chicago. The “Chicago School” of antitrust has included both economists (such as 
Aaron Director, Ward Bowman, and George Stigler) as well as economically-minded 
legal scholars (such as Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank Easterbrook). 
Although the terms “Chicago School” and “law and economics” are often used 
interchangeably, this Article argues for a broader conception of law and economics, 
including scholars who might consider themselves in opposition to the Chicago 
perspective. It remains true, however, that Chicagoans have been among the most 
influential proponents of the economic approach to antitrust. The classic (and most 
doctrinaire) expression of the Chicago perspective is Robert H. Bork, The 
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (The Free Press ed., 1993) 
(1978). 
2
The traditional antitrust paradigm, suspicious of a wide range of business 
practices, has been referred to as antitrust’s “inhospitality tradition.” See Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1984). 
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profoundly influenced the field, but little explanation as to exactly how 
this influence was achieved. Many scholars assume, sometimes tacitly, that 
the economic analysis of law and economics scholarship had a direct, ed-
ucative influence on the Supreme Court.
3
 Under this view, Supreme 
Court Justices were enlightened by modern economic theory, leading 
them to reject the populist interventionism that had characterized earlier 
antitrust jurisprudence. Other scholars have challenged this narrative, 
arguing that changes in the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence primarily re-
flected changes in its composition, specifically the conservative appoint-
ments of the Nixon presidency (Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Rehnquist), which shifted the ideological balance of the Court.
4
 Under 
this interpretation, conservative Justices were ideologically predisposed 
toward business-friendly antitrust decisions, for which the market-based 
reasoning of law and economics was simply a convenient justification. 
Robert Bork himself, among the Chicago School’s most influential fig-
ures, attributed the change to both factors (though he characterized the 
Nixon appointments as the “decisive cause”).
5
 Ultimately, what these dif-
ferent interpretations share in common is their limited evidentiary ba-
sis—most are derived from impressionistic reviews of a select number of 
Supreme Court decisions, rather than systematic analysis of larger histor-
ical trends. Given the focus of existing scholarship on the doctrinal fea-
 
3
See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bork’s “Legislative Intent” and the Courts, 79 
Antitrust L.J. 941, 944 (2014) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Legislative Intent]; Douglas H. 
Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of Consistency and 
Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 217, 218 (2010) 
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis]; William E. Kovacic, Failed 
Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for 
Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1105, 1134 (1989) [hereinafter Kovacic, Failed 
Expectations]; William E. Kovacic, Out of Control? Robert Bork’s Portrayal of the U.S. 
Antitrust System in the 1970s, 79 Antitrust L.J. 855, 878 (2014) [hereinafter Kovacic, 
Out of Control?]; William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and 
the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 Wayne L. Rev. 1413, 1417 (1990); 
George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of the Antitrust Paradox, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 455, 456 (2008); Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands of Antitrust Policy: Where It 
Has Been, Where It Is Now, Where It Will Be in Its Third Century, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 239, 248 (1999); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger 
Court’s Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 2 (1982); see 
also Marc Allen Eisner, Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics: 
Institutions, Expertise, and Policy Change 185–87 (1991) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s adoption of the efficiency norm in antitrust cases). 
4
See, e.g., Andrew Gavil, A First Look at the Powell Papers: Sylvania and the Process of 
Change in the Supreme Court, Antitrust, Fall 2002, at 8; Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law 
and Economics, and the Courts, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1987, at 181, 215; 
Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 Antitrust L.J. 649, 651–52 
(2014). 
5
Bork, supra note 1, at x–xiv. 
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tures of individual cases, the broader influence of economic theory on 
the Supreme Court remains uncertain. 
This Article moves beyond previous scholarship by presenting a 
comprehensive, quantitative study of every Supreme Court antitrust case 
from 1950 to 2010, a period including the decades before, during, and 
after the economic turn in antitrust. To conduct this study, I compiled a 
database of all of the Court’s antitrust cases within the relevant period of 
interest, coding each decision and each individual Justice’s vote for a 
number of variables relating to law and economics scholarship. Rather 
than focusing on the judicial language of only the most pivotal antitrust 
opinions, the method employed by most previous scholars, I have at-
tempted to identify systematic relationships between specific variables 
(number of citations to law and economics scholarship, for example) and 
the Court’s broader voting patterns. This approach allows for more gen-
eralized conclusions regarding the practical influence of law and eco-
nomics.
6
 
My methodology is inspired by the political science literature on the 
Supreme Court, much of which emphasizes quantitative analysis over the 
doctrinal focus of legal scholarship. My project is most directly influ-
enced by the work of Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal; like many studies 
of the Supreme Court, my database of antitrust cases is derived from 
Spaeth’s much larger U.S. Supreme Court Database.
7
 Spaeth and Segal’s 
influence extends beyond choice of methodology, moreover, as their 
 
6
Although most studies of changes in antitrust law have relied on traditional 
qualitative methods, a small number of legal scholars have approached the subject 
from a quantitative perspective. William Kovacic’s statistical analysis of antitrust 
decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals is a particularly impressive example. William 
E. Kovacic, Reagan’s Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 
49, 55 (1991); see also William E. Kovacic, Judicial Appointments and the Future of 
Antitrust Policy, Antitrust, Spring 1993, at 8, 9 [hereinafter Kovacic, Judicial 
Appointments]. Also, Hillary Greene and Daniel Sokol have conducted a citation 
analysis of the influence of the Areeda-Hovenkamp antitrust treatise. Hillary Greene 
& D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2039, 
2040–41 (2015). The economist Vivek Ghosal has modeled the influence of the 
Chicago School on Department of Justice antitrust enforcement activity. Vivek 
Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J. Compet. L. & 
Econ. 733, 733–44 (2011). Finally, Douglas Ginsburg and Leah Brannon have 
presented quantitative data on Supreme Court antitrust cases from 1967 to 2007. 
Leah Brannon & Douglas Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1967 to 
2007, Compet. Pol’y Int’l, Autumn 2007, at 3, 13–20.  
7
The Supreme Court Database, Wash. U. Law, http://supremecourtdatabase.org 
(last updated July 12, 2016). This database—the most widely used in social science 
studies of the Supreme Court—is the foundation of Spaeth and Segal’s empirical 
research on Supreme Court voting behavior. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, 
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model xvi–xvii (1993); Jeffrey A. Segal 
& Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited i 
(2002) [hereinafter Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited]. 
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theory of judicial behavior suggests a useful framework for studying anti-
trust. In their work, Spaeth and Segal contrast the traditional “legal” 
model of Supreme Court voting, in which decisions are made by objec-
tive application of legal principles to the facts of the case, with their own 
“attitudinal” model, in which Justices vote according to their ideological 
views in order to achieve subjective policy preferences.
8
 Based on their 
research findings, Spaeth and Segal reject the legal model, claiming the 
attitudinal model better predicts observed Supreme Court voting pat-
terns.
9
 
In the antitrust literature, the legal and attitudinal models are paral-
leled by the contrasting perspectives on law and economics—one empha-
sizing its objective persuasiveness, the other claiming ideological bias. 
Although the efficiency arguments of law and economics may not be “le-
gal” in the strictest sense,
10
 they can nevertheless be analogized to tradi-
tional legal arguments. Under this analogy, the “legal” model would pre-
dict that antitrust cases are decided according to the persuasiveness of 
the parties’ economic claims. This perspective assumes that questions of 
economics are susceptible to objective judicial determination. The attitu-
dinal model, on the other hand, would place little significance on the 
parties’ arguments, predicting instead that Justices vote per their preex-
isting ideological preferences. This perspective assumes that Supreme 
Court appointees are fundamentally partial in matters of economic poli-
cy. The differences between legal and economic reasoning mean that this 
is not a perfect analogy; given the prominence of economic policy con-
siderations in many Supreme Court cases, one might even conceive of an 
“expertise” model in place of the more general legal model.
11
 Whether 
conceived as a matter of legal reasoning or as a matter of economic ex-
pertise, however, this central distinction between knowledge and ideolo-
gy is the historical problem at the heart of my study. Did law and eco-
nomics provide the Court with a more sophisticated analytical 
framework? Or—as suggested by the attitudinal model—did it merely 
provide rhetorical cover for Justices’ preexisting ideological views? 
 
8
Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited, supra note 7, at 48–97. The 
“legal” model is, of course, the model most familiar to trained lawyers. 
9
See id. at 428–35. Spaeth and Segal also discuss a third, “rational choice” model, 
in which Justices engage in strategic behavior in order to achieve subjective policy 
preferences. See id. at 97. Since the rational choice model is essentially a more 
complex variation of the attitudinal model, this Article will limit its discussion to the 
legal and attitudinal models. 
10
Law and economics often emphasizes economic efficiency over traditional 
legal authority. As discussed infra Part III, efficiency arguments have proven highly 
successful in antitrust cases. 
11
The rise of economics as a form of (ostensibly) objective policy expertise is 
addressed in Eisner, supra note 3, at 188.  
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Based on my research, this Article argues that the Nixon appoint-
ments of the late 1960s and early 1970s were the primary cause of the ma-
jor changes in antitrust jurisprudence, but that academic developments 
have infused these changes with an intellectual legitimacy they might 
otherwise have lacked, effectively insulating them from future changes to 
the partisan balance of the Court. Although the conservative decisions of 
the Burger Court were—I argue—driven by ideology rather than scholar-
ship, the academic theories used to justify these decisions have been in-
fluential across the political spectrum. The result has been a rightward 
shift throughout the entire antitrust community, not only in specific pol-
icy views, but in fundamental value assumptions as well. Although this 
complex relationship among politics, law, and scholarship has been par-
ticularly influential in the antitrust field, similar patterns can also be ob-
served in other economically-oriented fields of law.
12
 The conjunction of 
knowledge and ideology that has characterized the history of antitrust law 
therefore speaks to broader developments in recent American legal his-
tory. 
The conclusions of this Article are subject to certain qualifications. 
First, and most obviously, the antitrust decisions of the Supreme Court 
are only one of several sources of antitrust law—even within the judicial 
branch, they represent but a small fraction of the antitrust cases decided 
by the federal courts. The vast majority of antitrust cases are resolved by 
district courts and the U.S. courts of appeals, which arguably play a more 
important role in determining actual antitrust disputes.
13
 In addition, an-
titrust trials in the district courts often feature greater economic content 
than Supreme Court review, as they regularly include the participation of 
economists as expert trial witnesses. That said, in light of the final author-
ity of the Supreme Court and its power to shape nationwide antitrust pol-
icy—as well as the ready availability of Supreme Court briefs, oral argu-
ments, and other supporting case materials for research—an exclusive 
focus on Supreme Court cases can be justified on practical grounds. Sec-
ond, the aggregate data presented in this Article does not, in and of it-
self, convey certain of the most important changes in the Supreme 
Court’s antitrust caseload, including the end of automatic appeals under 
the Expediting Act,
14
 the reduction in government enforcement actions 
 
12
Bankruptcy, corporate law, and securities regulation, for example. 
13
See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Influence of the Areeda-Hovenkamp Treatise in 
the Lower Courts and What It Means for Institutional Reform in Antitrust, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 
1919, 1920 (2015). Not all antitrust cases are federal, moreover. Indeed, with the 
retrenchment of federal antitrust enforcement over the past 35 years, state attorneys 
general have assumed a larger role in antitrust prosecution. 
14
The Expediting Act, enacted in 1903, allowed direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court in civil antitrust cases in which the government was the plaintiff. Expediting 
Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 29 
(2012)). This procedure was repealed in 1974 by the Antitrust Procedures and 
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during the Reagan administration,
15
 and changing patterns in the Court’s 
certiorari process,
16
 all of which have contributed to a significant de-
crease in the number of Supreme Court antitrust cases heard each year. 
Indeed, this decrease is so significant that comparisons between earlier 
and later years in the database become difficult. Finally—as discussed in 
greater detail in Part II—individual coding decisions often entailed sub-
jective judgments, particularly in ambiguous or marginal cases. Although 
I have tried to be as transparent and consistent as possible in my coding 
methodology, the very nature of the data means that other researchers 
using the same evidence would likely code at least some cases different-
ly.
17
 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II presents 
quantitative findings, together with a discussion of methodology. The 
general conclusion of these findings is that Supreme Court antitrust deci-
sions are largely (though not exclusively) determined by Justices’ preex-
isting policy views. Part III presents three qualitative case studies which 
illustrate the general patterns discussed in Part II. For this Section of the 
Article, I have selected three well-known cases dating from before, dur-
ing, and after the economic turn in antitrust jurisprudence: Brown Shoe 
Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 
433 U.S. 36 (1977), and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). Together, these cases demonstrate how the 
very conception of antitrust has changed over the decades—not only 
among Justices, but among scholars and practitioners as well. Part IV 
concludes, discussing the relevance of these findings to the future direc-
tion of Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence, as well as their signifi-
cance to broader changes in U.S. legal-economic policy. 
II. QUANTITATIVE DATA 
The influence of law and economics (particularly the Chicago 
School) on U.S. competition policy has been a major concern of antitrust 
scholarship since at least the 1980s. Scores of articles, lectures, and even 
 
Penalties Act, Pub. L. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
15
For a detailed study of the reduction in government enforcement actions 
under the Reagan administration, including the promulgation of revised merger 
guidelines by the Department of Justice, see Eisner, supra note 3, at 184–227. 
16
The Court’s plenary docket has significantly decreased in recent decades, for a 
variety of reasons. See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The 
Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 737 (2001); Ryan J. Owens & 
David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1219 (2012); Kenneth W. Starr, Essay, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The 
Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1363 (2006). 
17
All data used in this Article are available from the author upon request. 
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entire books have addressed the subject.
18
 Much of this scholarship has 
emphasized doctrinal, “internalistic” analysis of only the most well-known 
antitrust cases, while some has limited its focus to only a specific area of 
antitrust law (e.g., price discrimination, vertical restraints, etc.).
19
 This Ar-
ticle presents a much broader perspective, assessing every Supreme Court 
antirust case from 1950 to 2010. 
A. Case Selection and Coding 
The population of cases included in this study consists of every Su-
preme Court case (1) directly involving antitrust issues, (2) decided on 
the merits (i.e., excluding certiorari determinations), and (3) decided 
between (and including) the 1950 and 2010 Court terms.
20
 Although my 
primary period of interest was originally the 1970s and 1980s, the dec-
ades in which I assumed the influence of law and economics was most 
decisive, I included “extra” decades both before and after this period to 
provide historical baselines for comparison. As it turns out, the data from 
after the 1980s are in certain ways the most interesting. 
The first step in constructing my database was to search for all Su-
preme Court cases between 1950 and 2010 that are assigned the topic 
“29T” (antitrust and trade regulation) in the Westlaw legal database sys-
tem. This search yielded 292 cases. Of these, I excluded “pure” trade 
regulation cases that lacked meaningful antitrust issues. Examples of 
such excluded cases include FTC actions concerning commercial fraud, 
false advertising, and other deceptive or unfair trade practices. Excluding 
these cases left a remaining total of 244 antitrust cases, dating from the 
 
18
For but a small sample, see How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: 
The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust (Robert 
Pitofsky ed., 2008); Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law 1 (Antonio 
Cucinotta et al. eds., 2002); Ingo L. O. Schmidt & Jan B. Rittaler, A Critical 
Evaluation of the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis at ix–x (1989); 
Brannon & Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 21; Ginsburg, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at 
941; Frank Easterbrook, The Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct, 31 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 439 (2008); Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 
217; Kaplow, supra note 4, at 181; Kovacic, Failed Expectations, supra note 3, at 1134; 
William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant 
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 17–32 
(2007); Kovacic, Judicial Appointments, supra note 6, at 50; Kovacic, Out of Control?, 
supra note 3, at 878; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979); Priest, supra note 3, at 456; Sullivan, supra note 3, at 23. 
19
“Internalism,” a term borrowed from the history of science, refers here to the 
study of ideas purely in terms of their narrow intellectual context. 
20
The Supreme Court operates on an “October term” system, whereby cases are 
heard and decided beginning the first Monday in October and continuing to the 
following spring/summer. For purposes of this study, cases are assigned to the year in 
which the relevant Supreme Court term began, rather than the calendar year in 
which the case was decided (if different). 
LCB_21_1_Article_4_Hutchison (Do Not Delete) 2/26/2017  12:20 PM 
154 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1 
1950 to 2009 October terms (no antitrust cases were decided in the 2010 
October term).
21
 
After identifying the population of cases, I pulled them from the 
U.S. Supreme Court Database and inserted them into my own custom da-
ta file. For purposes of this study, the most important information in the 
U.S. Supreme Court Database was the Justice-level vote data associated 
with each case. These data permitted analysis of individual Justices’ vot-
ing patterns in relation to case-level variables. Unfortunately, few of the 
case-level variables included in the U.S. Supreme Court Database were 
relevant to my particular research questions. I therefore coded my own 
set of variables based on my own analysis of the cases in the database. 
This required reading each and every decision, as well as the correspond-
ing briefs of the parties and amici curiae, and assigning each case numer-
ical values for several variables relating to law and economics scholarship. 
Description and analysis of these variables is provided below. 
B. Case-Level Patterns 
This Part II.B discusses case-level patterns—i.e., patterns in the out-
comes of Supreme Court cases, rather than the votes of individual Justic-
es. These case-level patterns are not particularly surprising, as they tend 
to confirm many widely-held assumptions. Specifically, the data show that 
during the period under examination, (1) the Court became more likely 
to issue “market-based” antitrust decisions, (2) the Court, litigants, and 
amici curiae increasingly cited law and economics scholarship, and (3) 
antitrust cases became increasingly characterized by the presence of for-
mal economic arguments. 
1. Decision Outcomes 
Perhaps the most basic measure of ideational change in Supreme 
Court antitrust jurisprudence is the extent to which the Court’s decisions 
have reflected the market logic of law and economics. To assess this 
change in quantitative terms, I coded each decision in the database as ei-
ther “market-based” or “interventionist.” Decisions coded as “market-
based” reflect a narrow economic view of antitrust, often deferring to 
market outcomes and emphasizing economic efficiency. Policies associ-
ated with market-based decisions include (for example) relative toler-
ance toward economic concentration, the rejection of per se rules
22
 
 
21
At the time of writing, the latest case in the dataset was Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010), which was decided May 24, 2010 as part of the 
Court’s 2009 term. 
22
A “per se” rule is a Court-created decision rule that certain market practices 
are illegal per se under the antitrust laws. If a plaintiff can establish that a defendant’s 
actions fall within the scope of a per se rule, judicial inquiry ends and the behavior is 
deemed conclusively illegal, regardless of any economic benefits claimed by the 
defendant. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
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against practices other than horizontal restraints, and an assumption that 
unilateral market practices are usually efficient.
23
 Decisions coded as “in-
terventionist,” on the other hand, reflect more traditional antitrust val-
ues, emphasizing social and political concerns rather than economic effi-
ciency. Interventionist themes include (again, for example) hostility 
toward even moderate levels of economic concentration, fundamental 
suspicion of aggressive market behavior, and the application of per se 
rules to a wide variety of market practices. Given the broad scope of these 
two categories, certain cases in the database could potentially be coded as 
both. For example, as I have defined them, the “market-based” and “in-
terventionist” positions on horizontal price fixing are essentially the 
same—both would advocate per se prohibition. The two categories are 
not always mutually exclusive, in other words. Since the focus of my anal-
ysis is the Court’s consistency with market-based antitrust scholarship, deci-
sions consistent with both categories were coded as market-based.
24
 Cer-
tain decisions were difficult to categorize as either market-based or inter-
interventionist (cases involving various forms of antitrust immunity, for 
example). Rather than exclude these cases from the analysis, I simply did 
the best I could based on a close reading of the particular decision.
25
 
The propensity of the Court to issue market-based decisions in a giv-
en term was calculated by dividing the number of market-based decisions 
by the total number of antitrust decisions that term (thereby normalizing 
for the varying number of antitrust decisions per term). The resulting 
percentage data for the 1950–2009 terms are shown in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775, 776–77 (1965). Per se rules can be contrasted with 
the more permissive antitrust “rule of reason.” Id. The last several decades of antitrust 
jurisprudence have witnessed a substantial narrowing of per se rules. 
23
Use of the term “market-based” is potentially ambiguous, as even the Chicago 
School advocates prohibiting certain market practices, most notably cartel 
arrangements. Moreover, “interventionist” policy was often inspired by classical 
economic models of perfect market competition. Despite this overlap between the 
two terms, I believe a “market-based”/“interventionist” binary is less ambiguous than 
the traditionally-used “conservative”/“liberal” binary. 
24
This coding rule may result in a bias toward categorizing decisions as market-
based. However, it allows an unbiased measure of change in the Court’s decision 
making over time. See infra Figure 1. 
25
In the U.S. Supreme Court Database, decisions are coded under the 
conventional rubric of “conservative” versus “liberal.” In 73% of the cases in my 
database, this conservative/liberal categorization corresponds with my own market-
based/interventionist categorization (i.e., a case coded as “conservative” in the U.S. 
Supreme Court Database is coded as “market-based” in my own database, or vice 
versa). The primary source of discrepancies between the two coding schemes is that 
decisions imposing antitrust liability for horizontal price fixing, market allocation, 
and other cartel-like arrangements are coded as “liberal” in the U.S. Supreme Court 
Database and “market-based” in my own database (under the logic that even the 
Chicago School advocates prohibiting inefficient horizontal restraints). 
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After the 1992 term, the data become intermittent, as 1992 was the last 
term the Court consistently decided at least one antitrust case per term.
26
 
Although the Court decided fewer antitrust cases after 1992, its likeli-
hood of issuing a market-based decision in any given case continued to 
increase. Significantly, in six of the eight terms after 1992 in which the 
Court decided at least one antitrust case, 100% of its decisions were cod-
ed as market-based. 
As these data illustrate, the general perception that Supreme Court 
antitrust decisions have become increasingly market-oriented is correct. 
Although aggregate decision data does not explain what caused this in-
crease, the timing of the shift toward market-based antitrust decisions—
most pronounced in the early 1970s—suggests that judicial appointments 
likely played an important role. President Nixon made his first Court ap-
pointment in 1969 (Chief Justice Burger), and the 1972 term was the first 
full term in which all four of Nixon’s appointees (Burger, plus Blackmun, 
Powell, and Rehnquist) served together on the Court. So composed, the 
Burger Court was much more likely to issue market-based antitrust deci-
sions than the preceding Warren Court (which was less likely to issue 
market-based decisions than the preceding Vinson Court), as shown in 
Figure 1. The role of specific Justices in the Court’s antitrust decisions is 
discussed in greater detail in Part II.C below. 
2. Law and Economics Citations 
In addition to the outcomes of the cases themselves, another rele-
vant measure of the influence of law and economics is the number of ci-
 
26
In Figures 1–7, terms in which no antitrust cases were decided are excluded 
from the bar charts. The time axes are therefore more compressed for the years 
1993–2009 than for 1950–1992. 
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tations by the Court, parties (both plaintiffs and defendants), and amici 
curiae in their respective case documents. Citations by the Court itself 
are the clearest indication of influence, but citations in party and amicus 
briefs are also relevant, for two reasons: First, economic arguments de-
rived from parties’ or amici’s academic citations may influence the 
Court’s decisions, even in cases where the Court does not cite the aca-
demic literature itself. Second, the amount of law and economics cita-
tions in party and amici briefs may suggest the general “state of the law,” 
in that it indicates what type of arguments litigants expect the Court to 
respond to.
27
 
 For purposes of this study, a “law and economics citation” means any 
citation to any book or article: (1) addressing the subject of competition 
law and (2) written by (a) an economist or (b) a legal scholar significant-
ly relying on economic theory. In deciding whether to count a citation as 
a “law and economics citation,” I did not draw a distinction between “con-
servative” (or market-based) and “liberal” (or interventionist) scholar-
ship. Any citation to any book or article relying substantially on economic 
theory was counted, regardless of the political orientation or policy con-
clusions of the cited author.
28
 My decision to treat all economic scholar-
ship equally represents an attempt to determine whether economic anal-
ysis, in and of itself, is associated with particular policy conclusions, 
 
27
A difficulty with citation analysis is controlling for changes in the total number 
of all citations over time. If judges and practitioners are simply citing more of 
everything, an increase in a specific type of citation may not be particularly 
meaningful. With respect to Supreme Court opinions, recent empirical research 
indicates that citations to certain types of authority (prior Supreme Court decisions 
and non-legal secondary sources) have increased since World War II, for a variety of 
reasons. Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of 
Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 489, 531–40 (2010); James H. Fowler et 
al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 15 Pol. Analysis 324, 333 (2007); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. 
Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. Legal Stud. 495, 500–03 
(2000). On the other hand, in their study of citations to non-legal sources, Schauer 
and Wise also present evidence that neither the annual page output nor the average 
number of citations per page of reported Court opinions has significantly changed 
over the same time period. See id. at 500. 
 Unfortunately, due to practical constraints and a lack of relevant data, I was 
unable to control for possible changes in total citations. However, as the increase in 
law and economics citations shown in Figure 2 exceeds the increase in citations to 
prior Court decisions over the same period, Fowler et al., supra, at 333, I suspect that 
the increase in law and economics citations is a largely independent phenomenon. 
To my knowledge, no research suggests any systematic increase in total citations in 
party and amici briefs. 
28
A citation to Joe Bain was counted the same as a citation to George Stigler, for 
example. As a practical matter, the majority of legal-economic citations by the Court, 
parties, and amici were free-market in orientation, particularly in the later years of 
the database. 
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distinct from the exogenous political leanings of particular law and eco-
nomics scholars. 
 According to the conventional wisdom, the Chicago School was re-
sponsible for introducing economic analysis to antitrust law.
29
 If correct, 
this view implies a correlation in time between the rise of the Chicago 
School in the 1970s and the prevalence of law and economics citations in 
case documents. Many commentators have challenged this conventional 
wisdom, however. According to these scholars, economics has always 
played an important role in antitrust law, and the novelty of the Chicago 
School was in the specific type of economics it embodied.
30
 If the econom-
ic approach to antitrust law predates the rise of the Chicago School, as 
these arguments suggest, one would expect to see the absence of a corre-
lation between the rise of the Chicago School and law and economics ci-
tations. Given these differing perspectives, the empirical question of how 
often and when the Court, litigants, and amici curiae have cited law and 
economics scholarship becomes particularly significant. 
 Beginning with the Court itself, Figure 2 shows the average number 
of law and economics citations per majority opinion
31
 for each term:
32
 
 
29
For an example of this conventional wisdom, see Priest, supra note 3, at 456. 
30
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm, 
in How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative 
Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust 109, 109 (2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 217–20 (1985) [hereinafter 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust After Chicago]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and 
Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 Antitrust Bull. 613, 616–17 
(2010); Kaplow, supra note 4, at 184–87; Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust 
and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 Geo. L.J. 1511, 
1520–22 (1984). Even members of the Chicago School itself acknowledge the 
importance of the earlier “Harvard School” of antitrust economics. See, e.g., Posner, 
supra note 18, at 929. 
31
This analysis does not include concurrences or dissents, mainly due to 
personal time constraints. 
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Figure 2 displays a similar pattern as Figure 1: in general, the Court cited 
law and economics scholarship infrequently prior to the 1970s, while law 
and economics citations were most common in the last two decades of 
the time series. Thus, the increase in market-based Court decisions seen 
in Figure 1 seems to have been accompanied by a similar increase in law 
and economics citations. Given the relative lack of citations in the first 
two decades of the time series, these data cast doubt on the argument 
that economics has always been central to antitrust law.
33
 Although the 
structuralist scholarship of these earlier decades may have been influen-
tial in academic circles, it was rarely cited by the Court. 
Continuing on to plaintiffs and defendants, Figure 3 shows the aver-
age combined total law and economics citations contained in (1) the ini-
tial brief, (2) the reply brief (if applicable), and (3) the supplemental 
brief (if applicable) of each party per case, for each term in the data-
base:
34
 
 
 
Again, law and economics citations increased in the 1970s and 1980s. 
When the data are plotted as a graph, however, this trend is overshad-
 
32
The average (arithmetic mean) of law and economics citations per majority 
opinion was calculated by summing the law and economics citations in all majority 
opinions in a given term, then dividing by the number of decisions that term. When 
summing citations, multiple citations to the same work within a single opinion were 
each counted as separate citations. 
33
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
34
The average (arithmetic mean) of law and economics citations per set of 
initial, reply, and supplemental briefs was calculated by summing the law and 
economics citations included in all sets of briefs in a given term, then dividing by the 
number of cases that term (this procedure was performed separately for plaintiffs and 
defendants). When summing citations, multiple citations to the same work within a 
single set of briefs were each counted as separate citations. 
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owed by the very high number of defendant citations in 2005, 2006, and 
2008. Although these extreme averages are partly the result of fewer anti-
trust cases per term (only a single antitrust case was decided in the 2008 
term, for example), they also reflect a significant increase in law and 
economics citations by defendants’ counsel. This increase may be a stra-
tegic response to the Court’s extremely high rate of market-based anti-
trust decisions since the early 1990s. 
 Finally, Figure 4 shows the average law and economics citations per 
amicus brief, broken down by pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff amici, for 
each term:
35
 
 
 
Figure 4 displays the familiar pattern of increasing law and economics ci-
tations. Averaging the number of citations per brief obscures two addi-
tional trends in amicus practice, however. First, the average number of 
filings per case increased significantly over the time series, from no filings 
at all during the first several years to a high of 19 in Verizon Communica-
tions Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP in 2003.
36
 The phenome-
non of increasing amicus filings is hardly unique to antitrust law—
 
35
In keeping with the decision to only include cases decided on the merits (and 
therefore to exclude certiorari determinations), I only examined amicus briefs 
addressing the merits of the case. Filings by amici recommending or opposing 
certiorari are not included in Figure 4. 
 The average (arithmetic mean) of law and economics citations per amicus brief 
was calculated by summing the law and economics citations in all amicus briefs in a 
given term, then dividing by the total number of amicus briefs filed that term (this 
procedure was performed separately for pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff amici). 
When summing citations, multiple citations to the same work within a single brief 
were each counted as separate citations. 
36
540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1998 2009
Figure 4. Average Law and Economics Citations 
per Amicus Curiae Brief, by Term
Pro-plaintiff Pro-defendant
Trendline (Pro-plaintiff) Trendline (Pro-defendant)
LCB_21_1_Article_4_Hutchison (Do Not Delete) 2/26/2017  12:20 PM 
2017] LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOLARSHIP 161 
indeed, it pervades nearly every area of the Supreme Court’s docket.
37
 
Given the tendency of amici to emphasize economic policy arguments in 
antitrust cases, however, this phenomenon has been a major source of 
increasing law and economics citations.
38
 Second, aggregate data fails to 
highlight individual amicus briefs containing very high numbers of law 
and economics citations. These briefs become particularly notable in the 
final decade of the time series, in which many cases feature economics-
heavy amicus briefs filed by business groups, policy institutes, and even 
rival schools of antitrust scholars. For example, several recent cases fea-
ture amicus briefs by scholars advocating stereotypical Chicago School 
positions, as well as briefs from scholars advocating opposing “post-
Chicago” positions.
39
 This direct participation in Supreme Court cases by 
legal-economic scholars is an important example of the increasing econ-
omization of the both practice and discourse of antitrust law. 
 Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 indicate that law and economics ci-
tations by the Court, parties, and amici curiae were relatively infrequent 
prior to the 1970s. Citations began to increase thereafter, accelerating in 
the 1990s. While the infrequency of law and economics citations during 
the 1950s and 1960s supports the view that economic theory was not yet 
central to antitrust law, the reasons for the subsequent increase in cita-
tions remain open to debate. Since this increase is roughly correlated 
with the academic rise of the Chicago School, increasing citations may 
have been a function of the Chicago School’s intellectual influence. On 
the other hand, the increase begins in earnest only after the arrival of the 
Nixon appointees, suggesting that increasing citations may also have 
been a function of a more sympathetic, market-oriented Court. The con-
 
37
For discussion of the general phenomenon of increasing amicus filings, see 
Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 Law & Soc’y Rev. 807, 811 (2004); 
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 744 (2000); see also Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? 
Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & Pol. 33, 34 (2004). 
38
See supra Figure 4. 
39
The term “post-Chicago” refers to antitrust scholarship that shares the Chicago 
School’s normative emphasis on economic efficiency, but criticizes its economic 
models as overly simplistic. Post-Chicago scholarship has attempted to add concepts 
derived from game theory, behavioral analysis, and other forms of dynamic economic 
modeling to antitrust law. Although post-Chicago scholarship has been influential in 
the academic world, it has had less impact on Supreme Court jurisprudence, where 
the Chicago School remains dominant. For a variety of perspectives on post-Chicago 
antitrust scholarship, see, for example, How the Chicago School Overshot the 
Mark, supra note 18; Daniel A. Crane, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on Antitrust Institutions, 
78 Antitrust L.J. 43 (2012); Hovenkamp, Antitrust After Chicago, supra note 30; 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. 
Rev. 257 (2001); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and 
Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 Antitrust L.J. 147 (2012); Bruce H. 
Kobayashi, Game Theory and Antitrust: A Post-Mortem, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 411 (1997).  
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flation in time of these parallel developments makes ascribing causation 
particularly difficult. This difficulty is compounded, moreover, by the 
even greater increase in economic citations in the 1990s and 2000s, 
which may be attributable to consolidation of the economic approach to 
antitrust law or, alternatively, to an increasingly conservative Court. Rely-
ing on citation data alone, the only thing that can be said for certain is 
that law and economics citations have definitely increased. Understand-
ing why requires a broader analysis of additional characteristics of the 
Court’s antitrust cases. 
3. Economic Arguments 
 Citations to law and economics scholarship increased over the last 
several decades, but were these citations necessarily tied to substantive 
economic arguments? Perhaps not—examining Court opinions, party 
and amici briefs, and other case documents reveals that Justices and 
counsel often use legal-economic citations as a form of “window dress-
ing,” typically to bolster traditional legal arguments with additional (if 
superficial) academic support.
40
 It is rarer to encounter substantive ar-
guments that are genuinely based on economic theory, as opposed to the 
application of precedent to facts that characterizes traditional legal rea-
soning. Thus, the prevalence of economic arguments, and whether this 
prevalence has increased over time, is another important measure of the 
role of economics in antitrust law. 
 For purposes of this analysis, an opinion or brief was coded as con-
taining an “economic argument” if it included any specific, detailed, and 
relatively self-contained argument that economic theory compelled a par-
ticular decision outcome. As with the citation analysis above, no distinc-
tion was drawn between “conservative” (or market-based) and “liberal” 
(or interventionist) economic analysis. The coding scale was strictly bina-
ry—an opinion or brief was classified as either containing an economic 
argument or not. As is typical in legal practice, many opinions and briefs 
contained multiple, independent arguments in support of a given deci-
sion outcome. If just one of these arguments was economic in nature, the 
opinion or brief was coded as containing an economic argument. On the 
other hand, passing references to economic scholarship (i.e., window 
dressing) were insufficient—to qualify, the argument must have been rel-
atively developed. Overall, the essential distinction that I attempted to 
draw was between fundamentally legal arguments, grounded in the appli-
cation of legal rules (even if buttressed by economic citations), and fun-
 
40
See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 
U.S. 328 (1990), at 19–22 (citing Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner to argue for 
antitrust liability due to vertical maximum price fixing). 
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damentally economic arguments, grounded in the application of economic 
theory.
41
 
 Reflecting (and befitting) its nature as a legal institution, the 
Court’s use of economic arguments has been relatively infrequent. Figure 
5 shows the percentage of majority opinions containing at least one eco-
nomic argument, by term: 
 
 
Although there is a slight upward trend over time, the Court’s use of 
economic arguments can be best described as sporadic. One’s impression 
after reading all the cases in the database is that many Justices have been 
hesitant to engage in explicitly economic arguments, preferring to justify 
their decisions in the traditional terms of legal precedent. Even though 
the Court has become increasingly likely to cite law and economics 
scholarship (see Figure 2), these citations often provide ancillary support 
for conventional, precedent-based legal arguments. At least with respect 
to Supreme Court opinions, antitrust appears more law than economics.
42
 
 A somewhat different picture emerges from party and amicus briefs. 
Beginning with the parties, Figure 6 shows the percentage of cases in 
 
41
Obviously, this was often a subjective determination. Even when using 
consistent criteria, it is not always easy to differentiate a “legal” from an “economic” 
argument. Given my aim of distinguishing between “mere” legal-economic citations 
and substantive economic arguments—as well as the prevalence of casual, non-
substantive economic rhetoric in antitrust cases—my standard for what qualified as an 
economic argument was fairly strict. 
42
See supra Figure 5. 
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which plaintiffs and defendants presented economic arguments in their 
(1) initial brief, (2) reply brief (if applicable), or (3) supplemental brief 
(if applicable), for each term: 
 
 
The party data is also sporadic, with significant variation year to year. 
Figure 6 clearly shows, however, that defendants have used economic ar-
guments more often than plaintiffs. This pattern, visible in the bar graph, 
is even more evident from reading the briefs themselves. When read side 
by side, the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ briefs in many important antitrust 
cases reveal a striking contrast of differing legal strategies. 
 These differences are observable in some of the Court’s most pivotal 
antitrust decisions. Beginning in the 1970s, the Court overturned or sig-
nificantly weakened many of its prior holdings as to the per se illegality of 
a wide variety of market practices, including vertical restraints,
43
 tying ar-
rangements,
44
 and exclusionary refusals to deal.
45
 In many of these cases, 
plaintiffs’ counsel constructed their arguments in a straightforward, tra-
 
43
See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735–36 (1988); 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); Continental T.V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). 
44
See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43 (2006); 
Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27–29 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. 
Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 621–22 (1977). 
45
See, e.g., Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 138–40 (1998); 
Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297 
(1985). 
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ditional legal fashion. These arguments often proceeded by (1) citing the 
relevant per se rule, as articulated in prior Court precedent, (2) applying 
the rule to the facts of the case, and (3) concluding that the defendant’s 
conduct was per se illegal.
46
 Only rarely did plaintiffs’ counsel make any 
rigorous effort to explain why prohibition of the defendant’s conduct 
would benefit the broader economy. Defendants’ counsel, on the other 
hand, often took a far more economic approach, explicitly arguing that 
their clients’ practices promoted consumer welfare.
47
 These economic 
arguments invited the Court to reconsider its prior holdings, and to sub-
stitute economic theory for the judicial principle of stare decisis. 
 This significant disconnect between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ ar-
guments speaks to the transitional nature of the period. In certain cases, 
the differences between the parties are so pronounced that they seem to 
be arguing past each other.
48
 Since most of these cases were victories for 
the defendant, the dogged reliance of plaintiffs’ counsel on precedent 
seems misguided, at least in hindsight. In fairness to plaintiffs’ counsel, it 
is difficult to name any other area of law in which the Court has been so 
willing to disregard stare decisis. Who could have predicted that econom-
ic arguments would so consistently trump established Court precedent? 
But to invoke Justice Holmes, if “prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious”
49
 is what is meant by the law, then 
antitrust defendants may have had the benefit of better, more prophetic 
lawyers. Whether defendants’ counsel were more adept at responding to 
the Court’s economic concerns, or whether defendants’ economic argu-
ments were what led the Court to reexamine its prior holdings, is a ques-
tion taken up in Part II.C below. 
 I turn now to amicus briefs, in which economic arguments have be-
come the most prevalent. Figure 7 shows the annual percentage of cases 
in which at least one amicus brief supporting the plaintiff or the defend-
ant contained an economic argument: 
 
46
Plaintiff’s brief in Fortner is a prime example—the brief focuses on establishing 
a per se tying violation under the Sherman Act, without engaging the underlying 
policy rationale (or lack thereof) of the per se rule. See Brief for the Respondent at 
19, Fortner, 429 U.S. at 610 (No. 75-853), 1976 WL 194625. 
47
See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 49–60, GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (No. 
76-15), 1976 WL 181222.  
48
See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Jefferson 
Parish, 466 U.S. 2; Fortner, 429 U.S. 610. 
49
O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 460–61(1897). 
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Figure 7 shows a major increase, first with respect to pro-defendant amici, 
and followed by pro-plaintiff amici. Much of this increase was due to in-
creasing amicus filings per case—while there were zero amicus filings for 
several years during the 1950s, by the 1990s, ten or more amicus filings 
per antitrust case had become the norm. Simply as a matter of probabil-
ity, the higher the number of amicus briefs submitted per case, the great-
er the likelihood that any one of them would include an economic ar-
gument. This is not to say that the level of economic sophistication of the 
“average” amicus brief remained unchanged, however. As discussed in 
Part II.B.2 above, the advent of recurrent amicus filings by business 
groups, policy institutes, and academic scholars meant that the overall 
content of amicus briefs became increasingly economic over the period. 
Another recurrent amicus contributing to this process was the U.S. gov-
ernment. Although the Department of Justice had been sporadically in-
volved in private antitrust litigation for decades, its participation as ami-
cus curiae significantly increased during the 1980s. Under the framework 
of the “Private Action Project,” a program initiated by William F. Baxter 
(Assistant Attorney General for antitrust under the first Reagan admin-
istration), the Department sought to use amicus filings to systematically 
influence the direction of antitrust law.
50
 Under this program, Supreme 
Court cases in which the existing state of the law could be clarified or 
improved (according to the standards of the Reagan administration) 
 
50
See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661, 700 (1982). 
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were identified by the Department’s Antitrust Division. Department at-
torneys then drafted and submitted amicus briefs advocating particular 
decision outcomes. Given the powerful influence of the Chicago School 
within the Reagan-era Antitrust Division, these briefs regularly featured 
highly economic, market-based policy arguments. The Department’s ar-
guments often extended beyond the immediate case at hand, explicitly 
requesting that the Court overturn or modify established antitrust prece-
dents.
51
 Together, each of these three developments—increasing num-
bers of amicus briefs, the increasingly economic content of individual 
briefs, and the increasingly aggressive economic advocacy of the U.S. 
government—amplified the volume of economic arguments to which the 
Supreme Court was repeatedly exposed. 
 To summarize, what do these statistical patterns tell us about chang-
es in U.S. antitrust law? At a basic level, they provide confirmation that 
market-based Court decisions, law and economics citations, and the use 
of economic arguments have all increased since 1950. At a more granular 
level, they also show that parties and amici have engaged in economic ar-
guments more often than the Court, and that defendants have historical-
ly used economic arguments more often than plaintiffs. Although the da-
ta suggest intriguing relationships between these developments and the 
timing of Supreme Court appointments, case-level statistics only reveal so 
much regarding the central issue of causality. Was the market-based shift 
in the Court’s decisions a response to economic arguments? Or were the 
economic arguments of parties and amici a response to the Court’s mar-
ket-based decisions? Resolving this puzzle requires looking beyond the 
Court as a unitary institution and examining the role of individual Justic-
es in the changing direction of antitrust jurisprudence. 
C. Justice-Level Patterns 
 The statistics presented in Part II.B above bear out the conventional 
wisdom—that the substance and rhetoric of antitrust law has become in-
creasingly economic over time. The question of what caused this shift 
remains difficult to answer, however. The timing of the change in the 
Court’s decisions suggests judicial appointments played an important 
role (see Figure 1), though without additional evidence it is difficult to 
say more. Only an investigation of the voting behavior of individual Jus-
 
51
For discussion of the Private Action Project, see Eisner, supra note 3, at 207–
10. There is reason to believe the government has been a particularly influential 
amicus curiae. Among the cases in the database, the Court’s ruling was consistent 
with the government’s recommendation in 84% of cases in which the government 
submitted an amicus brief. If one only considers cases during the Reagan years, this 
figure increases to 90%. For additional discussion of the government’s role and 
influence as amicus curiae, see generally John Thorne, A Short Note on Government 
Amicus Briefs in Antitrust Cases, 2004 A.B.A. Antitrust Sec. 1–3. 
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tices can reveal the vote-specific factors that shape the Court’s aggregate 
decision record. 
 This Part II.C provides such an investigation: by comparing the votes 
of individual Justices against selected case-level variables, it seeks to de-
termine whether Justices’ voting decisions were influenced by economic 
arguments. As detailed below, the means of conducting this inquiry are 
twofold. The first method was simply to assess whether individual Justices’ 
voting records changed over time. The second was to compare the voting 
records of individual Justices in (1) cases in which one or both parties 
made an economic argument against (2) cases in which neither party 
made an economic argument. My findings indicate that while the anti-
trust views of certain Justices did evolve over time, economic arguments 
did not generally “convert” Justices from their preexisting views. 
1. Individual Justices’ Voting Over Time 
 As discussed in Part II.B.1, the antitrust decisions of the Supreme 
Court have become increasingly market-oriented. Since Supreme Court 
decisions are determined by majority voting, fully understanding this in-
crease requires tracking individual votes. From this perspective, the basic 
inquiry becomes whether the shift in the Court’s antitrust record was due 
to (1) changes in the voting patterns of incumbent Justices, or (2) the 
replacement of incumbent Justices with more conservative appointees. 
The simplest method of addressing this question is determining whether 
individual Justices’ voting patterns changed over time. Such a determina-
tion is possible with data derived from the U.S. Supreme Court Database, 
which includes the votes of individual Justices for every case in the collec-
tion. After coding the Court decisions in my own database as either mar-
ket-based or interventionist, it was straightforward to classify individual 
votes according to the same schema: For market-based decisions, votes 
with the majority (including concurrences) were coded as market-based, 
while votes with the dissent(s) (if any) were coded as interventionist. Sim-
ilarly, for interventionist decisions, votes with the majority (including 
concurrences) were coded as interventionist, while votes with the dis-
sent(s) (if any) were coded as market-based.
52
 
Whether these votes shifted over time speaks to the question of aca-
demic influence given the temporal increase in economic references in 
opinions, briefs, and other case documents. Since economic references 
increased after the 1960s, a corresponding increase in market-based votes 
on the part of a given Justice would tend to suggest that exposure to eco-
nomic ideas had influenced the Justice’s voting decisions. On the other 
 
52
There are a few odd exceptions in the database. In certain cases, based on my 
reading of the opinions, both the majority and dissenting votes were coded the same 
(i.e., market-based or interventionist), or concurring votes were coded differently 
from the majority. 
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hand, if a Justice’s voting remained essentially unchanged, it would tend 
to suggest the absence of influence. 
 The voting data for individual Justices indicate that while certain 
Justices’ antitrust views did evolve over time, most Justices arrived on the 
Court with stable, preexisting antitrust views. The data also indicate that 
later appointees to the Court were more market-oriented than their pre-
decessors. To convey these patterns visually, Figure 8 shows the annual 
percentage of cases in which each Justice
53
 cast market-based votes.
54
 
 
 
Figure 8. Antitrust Voting Records of Individual Justices Over Time 
 
 
53
Figure 8 includes each Justice who served for at least 10 terms between 1950 
and 2010 in which at least one antitrust case was decided by the Court. This excludes 
Justices Reed, Jackson, Burton, Minton, Vinson, Whittaker, Goldberg, Fortas, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, and Alito, who each served for less than 10 terms between 
1950 and 2010 in which at least one antitrust case was decided. The timescales for 
each chart in Figure 8 are different, given that each Justice served for different 
periods of time. Voting information for terms before 1950 and after 2010 is not 
included in my database, and therefore not shown in Figure 8. 
54
Cases in which the particular Justice did not participate are excluded from 
analysis. 
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As seen in Figure 8, while most Justices’ voting records remained 
relatively stable over their tenures, a few Justices’ voting records became 
increasingly market-oriented. The clearest and most interesting example 
of this phenomenon is Justice Brennan. Brennan’s antitrust record is 
particularly notable for two reasons: not only is he the Justice whose anti-
trust record changed the most—from very interventionist in the 1950s to 
relatively market-based by the 1980s—he is also widely considered one of 
the twentieth-century Court’s most important liberals. Indeed, even as 
Brennan’s antitrust record was moving in an increasingly market-based 
direction, his overall voting record (including all types of cases) was only 
becoming more and more liberal.
55
 This divergence between Brennan’s 
antitrust record and his record in other types of cases indicates that his 
antitrust views were not simply a function of his broader ideology. Given 
the time period of Brennan’s tenure—covering the most significant 
changes in antitrust practice—it may also suggest his growing acceptance 
of parties’ and amici’s economic arguments. 
 
55
As measured by the commonly-used Martin-Quinn score, Brennan’s overall 
judicial ideology became increasingly liberal over his tenure. See Andrew D. Martin & 
Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 Pol. Analysis 134 (2002). 
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As intriguing as such developments may be, any changes in the vot-
ing behavior of individual Justices are far outweighed by the greater ef-
fect of turnover in the composition of the Court. Each and every Justice 
appointed after Thurgood Marshall cast a higher percentage of market-
based votes than the departing Justice they replaced. Over the course of 
successive appointments, this led to a stable majority of market-based 
votes in most Supreme Court antitrust cases. Significantly, this phenom-
enon is not merely a function of party identity. When the analysis in-
cludes every Justice in the database, it becomes clear that all recent ap-
pointees, both Democratic and Republican, cast greater percentages of 
market-based votes than nearly every Justice predating the Nixon admin-
istration.
56
 This can be seen in Figure 9, which provides the total percent-
age of market-based votes cast by each Justice serving between 1950 and 
2009: 
Figure 9. Antitrust Voting Records of Individual Justices 
 
Black 22.31% White 38.3% 
Reed 50% Marshall 47.37% 
Frankfurter 66.07% Burger 70.67% 
Douglas 22.3% Blackmun 63.22% 
Jackson 60% Rehnquist 68.13% 
Burton 65% Powell 76.67% 
Minton 50% Stevens 62.65% 
Vinson 55.56% O’Connor 74.47% 
Clark 30.86% Scalia 80.56% 
Warren 18.56% Kennedy 71.88% 
Harlan 64.71% Souter 86.96% 
Whittaker 71.43% Thomas 77.27% 
Brennan 34.91% Ginsburg 68.75% 
Goldberg 52.63% Breyer 75% 
Fortas 23.08% Roberts 88.89% 
Stewart 60.16% Alito 83.33% 
 
As Figure 9 shows, recent conservative appointees have been more likely 
to cast market-based votes than prior conservative appointees, while re-
cent liberal appointees have been more likely to cast market-based votes 
than prior liberal appointees—as well as many prior conservative appoin-
tees! Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, current members of the Court’s 
liberal wing, have more market-oriented voting records than both Justice 
Harlan and Justice Stewart, historically considered antitrust conserva-
tives.
57
 If measured strictly in terms of antitrust decisions, the median Su-
 
56
The single exception being Justice Whittaker, who had an unusually brief 
tenure on the Court and cast an unusually high percentage of market-based votes. 
57
See supra Figure 9. 
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preme Court Justice shifted significantly rightward since the early 1970s. 
This phenomenon of later Court appointees—both Democrats and Re-
publicans—casting higher percentages of market-based votes than their 
immediate predecessors has been the single most important factor in the 
Court’s changing antitrust jurisprudence. 
2. Economic Arguments and Individual Justices’ Votes 
 Unfortunately, changes in Justices’ voting over time are only a crude 
measure of the influence of economic arguments. In effect, time is serv-
ing as a proxy for the economization of antitrust arguments, hardly a 
precise metric of the economic content of specific cases. Fortunately, 
there is a more direct means of assessing the relationship between eco-
nomic arguments and individual Justices’ votes: Using 2x2 contingency 
tables, I compare, for each Justice, the percentage of cases in which the 
Justice cast a market-based vote in (1) cases in which either party made at 
least one economic argument and (2) cases in which neither party made 
an economic argument. This comparison allows direct assessment of the 
statistical relationship between economic arguments and individual Jus-
tices’ votes. 
 The results are fascinating. In short, the effect of the presence of 
economic arguments on individual Justices depends on the particular 
Justice’s overall antitrust record: Justices who were more likely to cast 
market-based votes in all cases were even more likely to cast market-based 
votes in cases featuring economic arguments. Justices who were more 
likely to cast interventionist votes in all cases, however, were even less like-
ly to cast market-based votes in cases featuring economic arguments. In 
other words, the presence of economic arguments in antitrust cases 
seems to have an amplifying effect on Justices’ preexisting policy views. 
These results hold for nearly every Justice in the dataset.
58
 
 Figure 10 presents 2x2 contingency tables for the same Justices in-
cluded in Figure 8,
59
 reporting the Justice-specific relationships between 
(1) the presence or absence of at least one economic argument in the 
parties’ briefs (whether made by the defendant, plaintiff, or both)
60
 and 
(2) whether the Justice cast a market-based or interventionist vote:
61
 
 
58
The exceptions being Justice Souter and (significantly) Justice Brennan. Three 
early Justices, Burton, Minton, and Reed, cast market-based votes in approximately 
50% of total cases, but were significantly less likely to cast market-based votes in cases 
featuring economic arguments. This may be due to the fact that economic arguments 
(while rare) tended to support interventionist outcomes in the early 1950s. 
59
That is, Justices who served at least 10 terms between 1950 and 2010 in which 
at least one antitrust case was decided by the Court. 
60
Including the initial merits briefs, as well as reply briefs and supplemental 
briefs, if any. 
61
In social science research, contingency tables are often used to assess 
relationships between categorical variables. When used with sample data, they are 
typically accompanied by tests of statistical significance (most often the chi-square 
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Figure 10. Individual Justices’ Votes by Presence or Absence of Economic 
Arguments 
 
Black 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
73.27% 26.73% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
100% 0% 100% 
Total 77.69% 22.31% 100% 
Frankfurter 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
36.17% 63.83% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
22.22% 77.78% 100% 
Total 33.93% 66.07% 100% 
 
Douglas 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
73.50% 26.50% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
95.83% 4.17% 100% 
Total 77.30% 22.70% 100% 
 
Clark 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
64.62% 35.38% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
87.50% 12.50% 100% 
Total 69.14% 30.86% 100% 
 
 
test). For this analysis, I have not included significance tests because the data are not 
a sample—they encompass the entire population of individual votes within my period 
of interest. Significance testing is inapplicable because there is no statistical inference 
to be made. Whether substantively significant or not (a question for the reader to 
decide), the data speak for themselves. That said, if one were to perform two-tailed 
chi-square tests on the data in Figure 10, the results for Justice Black would be 
statistically significant at p ≤ 0.01; the results for Justices Douglas, Burger, and 
O’Connor would be statistically significant at p ≤ 0.05; and the results for Justices 
Harlan, Powell, Rehnquist, and Scalia would be statistically significant at p ≤ 0.1. 
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Warren 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
78.21% 21.79% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
94.74% 5.26% 100% 
Total 81.44% 18.56% 100% 
 
Harlan 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
41.18% 58.82% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
17.65% 82.35% 100% 
Total 36.47% 63.53% 100% 
 
Brennan 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
67.46% 32.54% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
58.14% 41.86% 100% 
Total 65.09% 34.91% 100% 
 
Stewart 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
43.75% 56.25% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
25.93% 74.07% 100% 
Total 39.84% 60.16% 100% 
 
White 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
60.19% 39.81% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
66.67% 33.33% 100% 
Total 61.7% 38.3% 100% 
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Marshall 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
52.86% 47.14% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
52% 48% 100% 
Total 52.63% 47.37% 100% 
 
Burger 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
36.54% 63.46% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
13.04% 86.96% 100% 
Total 29.33% 70.67% 100% 
 
Blackmun 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
43.33% 56.67% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
22.22% 77.78% 100% 
Total 36.78% 63.22% 100% 
 
Rehnquist 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
39.06% 60.94% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
14.81% 85.19% 100% 
Total 31.87% 68.13% 100% 
 
Powell 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
32.5% 67.5% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
5% 95% 100% 
Total 23.33% 76.67% 100% 
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Stevens 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
40% 60% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
32.14% 67.86% 100% 
Total 37.35% 62.65% 100% 
 
O’Connor 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
40% 60% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
0% 100% 100% 
Total 25.53% 74.47% 100% 
 
Scalia 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
28.00% 72.00% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
0.00% 100.00% 100% 
Total 19.44% 80.56% 100% 
 
Kennedy 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
34.78% 65.22% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
11.11% 88.89% 100% 
Total 28.13% 71.88% 100% 
 
Souter 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
6.67% 93.33% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
25.00% 75.00% 100% 
Total 13.04% 86.96% 100% 
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Thomas 
 Interventionist Vote Market-Based Vote Grand Total 
No Economic 
Argument 
35.71% 64.29% 100% 
Economic  
Argument(s) 
0.00% 100.00% 100% 
Total 22.73% 77.27% 100% 
 
As these tables show, the direction of the effect of economic argu-
ments on a particular Justice’s voting decisions has been dependent on 
the Justice’s overall antitrust record.
62
 Justice Powell, for example (one of 
the most conservative Justices in economic cases), cast a market-based 
vote in 67.5% of cases that did not feature economic arguments, but in 
95% of cases that did feature economic arguments. For Justices with in-
terventionist voting records, economic arguments had the opposite ef-
fect. Justice Warren, for example, cast a market-based vote in 21.79% of 
cases that did not feature economic arguments, but in only 5.26% of cas-
es that did feature economic arguments. This phenomenon is also seen 
in the lack of effect on Justices in the center: Justice Marshall, with the 
most centrist record in Figure 10, appears to have been unaffected by 
economic arguments either way. Marshall cast a market-based vote in 
47.37% of all cases, and cast almost the same percentage of market-based 
votes in cases that did and did not feature economic arguments. With 
Marshall, there seem to have been no preexisting convictions for eco-
nomic arguments to challenge or reinforce.
63
 
 Brennan is among the very few Justices whose record is inconsistent 
with this pattern. While Brennan cast a market-based vote in 35.91% of 
 
62
There is also an alternative interpretation of the data in Figure 10. Not all 
antitrust cases are equal in terms of the relevance of economic analysis to their 
decision, as some antitrust cases turn on technical legal issues with minimal economic 
implications. It is therefore possible that the presence of economic arguments in the 
parties’ briefs is a proxy for the economic nature of the underlying case. Under this 
interpretation, the Justices’ voting patterns in Figure 10 were influenced by the 
nature of the cases themselves, rather than by the manner in which they were argued 
by the parties. 
 While the nature of the cases may be a lurking variable in Figure 10, I doubt it is 
the primary explanation. Since the distribution of antitrust cases with highly 
economic implications has assumedly remained stable over time, but the frequency of 
economic arguments has significantly increased, it seems unlikely that economic 
arguments are a close proxy for underlying case content. 
63
This is consistent with perceptions of Marshall as an antitrust moderate who 
made voting decisions on a non-ideological, case-by-case basis. Given Marshall’s 
background, interest, and expertise in constitutional law, some commentators have 
portrayed him as comparatively disinterested in antitrust law, and thus particularly 
open to the influence of his law clerks and fellow Justices. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, 
Antitrust Decision Making and the Supreme Court: Perspectives from the Thurgood Marshall 
Papers, 42 Antitrust Bull. 93, 108–11 (1997). 
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all antitrust cases in which he voted, he cast a market-based vote in 
41.86% of cases featuring economic arguments and only 32.54% of cases 
that did not feature economic arguments.
64
 As discussed in Part II.C.1, 
Brennan is also the Justice whose antitrust record changed most over 
time, becoming increasingly market-oriented even as his overall record 
became increasingly liberal. If many Justices have joined the Court with 
relatively fixed antitrust views, Brennan may be the exception that proves 
the rule: a Justice whose perspective on antitrust was reshaped, post-
appointment, by developments in academic scholarship. 
D. Summary and Interpretation 
 Examining both case-level patterns and the voting records of indi-
vidual Justices reveals the market-based shift in antitrust jurisprudence 
was not the result of a single cause. As with many historical develop-
ments, it was shaped by multiple, complementary factors. That said, the 
most immediate and most important of these factors was turnover on the 
Court. The Nixon appointments, in particular, had a clear effect on the 
Court’s decision making. Once established on the Court, the Nixon ap-
pointees constituted a stable pro-defendant voting bloc, and were able to 
secure many pivotal antitrust decisions by garnering the support of their 
moderate colleagues.
65
 While these Republican Justices tended to be 
highly receptive to economic arguments,
66
 their receptiveness appears to 
have been due to political attitudes formed earlier in their careers, rather 
than to any post-appointment economic enlightenment. With the possi-
ble exception of Justice Burger (whose market-based voting increased 
somewhat), each of these Justices’ antitrust voting records remained sta-
ble over time,
67
 even as the content of party and amicus briefs became in-
creasingly economic.
68
 At the same time, incumbent Justices holding in-
terventionist views were generally unswayed by economic appeals.
69
 In 
terms of individual votes, it appears that preexisting political attitudes 
have been more important than economic arguments. 
 The Court’s embrace of market-based economics cannot be ex-
plained purely in political terms, however. As discussed in Part II.C.1 
above, certain liberal Justices of the older generation (most notably Jus-
tice Brennan) became more likely to support market-based decisions 
over the span of their tenures. This did not correspond with any right-
ward shift in their overall voting records (in the case of Brennan, quite 
the opposite). Even more significant were the market-based antitrust 
 
64
See supra Figures 9 & 10.  
65
See supra Figure 8. 
66
See supra Figure 10. 
67
See supra Figure 8. 
68
See supra Figures 2–7. 
69
See supra Figure 10. 
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views of newly-appointed Justices: By the 1990s, the market-based ap-
proach to antitrust law had transcended partisan divisions, characterizing 
the Court’s liberal wing as well as its conservatives.
70
 Indeed, nearly every 
member of the current Court—Democrats as well as Republicans—would 
be considered an antitrust conservative by the standards of the prior 
era.
71
 This development, more than any other, accounts for the current 
direction of antitrust law. 
 This fundamental shift in judicial attitudes is difficult to explain. 
Fully answering the question of why recent Justices, both liberal and con-
servative, have accepted the market-based approach to antitrust law 
would require examining the broader influence of economic thought on 
American legal culture. Such an ambitious inquiry is—unfortunately—
beyond the scope of this Article. A qualitative analysis of major antitrust 
cases can demonstrate how this transformation progressed, however. The 
following Part III presents such an analysis in view of the statistical trends 
discussed above, examining three major cases from three distinct phases 
in postwar antitrust law. 
III. CASE STUDIES 
 As the years have passed, the number of law and economics citations 
by the Court, litigants, and amici curiae has significantly increased, ar-
guments are more frequently cast in specifically economic terms, and the 
Court has become increasingly accepting of the policy conclusions of law 
and economics.
72
 Although statistical data provides a useful view of a legal 
field in transformation, it fails to convey the full flavor of these changes, 
which can only be drawn from reading the individual cases: the gradual 
yet inexorable shift in the assumptions, rhetoric, and argumentative 
strategies of nearly all legal actors involved. In order to convey these qual-
itative changes, this Part III presents a closer analysis of three landmark 
antitrust cases, each drawn from a distinct period in postwar antitrust law: 
Brown Shoe (1962), decided during the height of the Supreme Court’s in-
 
70
See supra Figure 8. 
71
See supra Figure 9. The only potential exception is Justice Kagan, the newest 
member of the Court, who has been involved in too few antitrust cases for an 
accurate assessment of her views. Even Justice Sotomayor has established a record as a 
moderate in business cases (based largely on her tenure on the Second Circuit), 
comfortable with the use of economic theory, particularly in antitrust cases. See Dana 
M. Muir et al., Justice Sotomayor on the Supreme Court: A Boon for Business?, 4 Va. L. Bus. 
Rev. 187, 198–99 (2009). At the time of this writing, little can be said of the future 
replacement for the late Justice Scalia, one of the Court’s most consistent antitrust 
conservatives. 
72
See supra Figures 2–7 (showing the increase in law and economics citations); 
Figure 6 (showing the percentage of cases in which plaintiffs and defendants 
presented economic arguments); Figure 5 (showing the percentage of majority 
opinions containing at least one economic argument). 
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terventionism, Sylvania (1977), signaling the transition to market-based 
antitrust jurisprudence, and Brooke Group (1993), representing the cur-
rent economic paradigm. 
 Each of these cases is famous (or infamous, depending on one’s 
perspective) for establishing legal precedents and policy assumptions that 
would influence antitrust law years to follow. Rather than focusing on 
their doctrinal significance—ground well covered by prior scholars—the 
analysis below provides a more descriptive, “externalistic” account of 
these cases’ decisions, including the legal strategies of the various parties, 
the decision-making process of the Court, and broader changes in the 
historical context that may have influenced their respective outcomes. 
Viewing these cases as representative examples of the trends identified in 
Part II can help to illuminate abstract statistics that might otherwise lack 
immediate impact. 
A. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States—Equalitarianism Versus Efficiency 
 Of the three cases selected for review, Brown Shoe represents the “in-
hospitality” era of traditional, interventionist antitrust. As such, it also has 
the least remaining legal force. A long-standing target of criticism by le-
gal and economic scholars,
73
 its central holding has been largely aban-
doned, though never formally overruled.
74
 Brown Shoe endured as control-
ling precedent for decades following its decision, however, and remains 
controversial today.
75
 In the words of Robert Bork (writing in 1978): “It is 
not merely a bad case, it is also a trend setter—as if the poems of E. A. 
Guest had determined the course of modern literature.”
76
 
 Brown Shoe involved a merger challenged by the U.S. government 
under amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the primary federal anti-
 
73
See, e.g., Dominick T. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a 
Policy Failure 245–46 (1982); Bork, supra note 1, at 198–216; Harlan M. Blake & 
William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 422, 
455–57 (1965); Thomas E. Kauper, The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of 
Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 325, 328–29 (1968); Richard A. 
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, 
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282, 302–12 
(1975). 
74
Brown Shoe’s legal significance was weakened by a series of pro-defendant 
Clayton Act decisions in the 1970s, and by the Department of Justice’s hands-off 
merger enforcement policies in the 1980s. With little likelihood of strong 
government enforcement, the anti-merger provisions of Clayton Act Section 7 (the 
specific statute under which the Brown Shoe case was brought) have faded in 
importance. For a discussion of Brown Shoe’s legacy, see Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth 
M. Vorrasi, The Remarkable 50-Year Legacy of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
Antitrust, Spring 2012, at 47. For a discussion of merger enforcement policy under 
the Reagan administration, see Eisner, supra note 3, at 195–97. 
75
Skitol and Vorrasi, supra note 74, at 47. 
76
Bork, supra note 1, at 210. 
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merger statute.
77
 In 1955, Brown Shoe Company, Inc., a large, integrated 
shoe manufacturer, had acquired by merger G. R. Kinney Company, Inc., 
a nationwide shoe retailer. Five years prior, under the Celler-Kefauver 
Antimerger Act of 1950, Congress had expanded the Clayton Act to cover 
asset acquisitions as well as stock acquisitions, an amendment intended to 
bring mergers under the act’s purview.
78
 The government challenged the 
Brown-Kinney merger pursuant to this amendment, claiming its effect 
“may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a mo-
nopoly” in the shoe industry, the relevant legal standard under the Clay-
ton Act.
79
 On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled for the government, de-
spite the facts that the combined, nationwide market share of Brown and 
Kinney was only 4.4% of national shoe manufacturing
80
 and only 2.3% of 
national retail sales
81
—hardly monopoly levels. The decision has since 
been pilloried as an excessive restraint on mergers and acquisitions, 
which explicitly protected less competitive firms from larger, more cost-
efficient rivals.
82
 What many of these criticisms fail to acknowledge is that 
Brown Shoe was consistent with the antitrust thinking of its time, and that 
it faithfully implemented Congress’s agenda in passing the Celler-
Kefauver amendments. 
1. The Court’s Opinion 
The social and political concerns animating the Brown Shoe decision 
are far removed from the narrow economic criteria that dominate anti-
trust today. The logic of the Court’s opinion, authored by Chief Justice 
Warren,
83
 focused on preserving the decentralized structure of the Amer-
ican shoe industry—characterized by a large number of small, independ-
ent manufacturers and retailers—from the incipient threat of powerful 
manufactures dominating the retail market.
84
 The issue of economic effi-
 
77
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 18 (2012)). 
78
Id. Although the Clayton Act’s original reference to acquisitions of “stock or 
other share capital” arguably included mergers even before 1950, it was not generally 
interpreted as regulating mergers until following the Celler-Kefauver amendments. 
79
Id. 
80
Brief for Appellant at 128, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 
(1962) (No. 4). 
81
Id. at 174. 
82
Armentano, supra note 73, at 245–46; Bork, supra note 1, at 215–16; Blake & 
Jones, supra note 73, at 456–57; Kauper, supra note 73, at 328–29; Posner, supra note 
73, at 302–12. 
83
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 294. The decision was unanimous except for a 
partial dissent by Justice Harlan, who believed the Court lacked proper jurisdiction. 
Id. at 357 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
84
The Brown Shoe decision is noted (and criticized) for establishing the legal 
standard that “tendencies toward concentration in industry are to be curbed in their 
incipiency” under Section 7. Id. at 346 (majority opinion). 
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ciency, obliquely raised in the Court’s opinion, was subordinated to the 
political goal of halting a “rising tide of economic concentration.”
85
 
Assessing the potential consequences of the merger, the Court 
found that in a context of increasing industry consolidation,
86
 Brown’s 
acquisition of Kinney and its vertical integration into retailing would 
“foreclose” part of the retail market to competing manufacturers (who 
would no longer be able to sell to Kinney), as well as part of the manufac-
tured shoe market to competing retailers (who would no longer be able 
to buy from Brown).
87
 Drawing on the legislative history of the Celler-
Kefauver amendments, the Court held that by “foreclosing the competi-
tors of either party from a segment of the market otherwise open to 
them,” the Brown-Kinney merger would deprive competing rivals of “a 
fair opportunity to compete.”
88
 The Court predicted Brown would “force” 
its product upon Kinney, thus eliminating Kinney as a competitive factor 
in the marketplace.
89
 Its condemnation of this outcome was not based in 
economic theory, however. In particular, the Court cited no theory ex-
plaining why Brown, assumedly a profit-maximizing enterprise, would 
pursue such a policy unless it created efficiencies allowing Brown to un-
dersell its competitors.
90
 This style of opinion—marked by ad hoc eco-
nomic reasoning from the bench and suspicion of aggressive business 
practices—was typical of the Warren Court.
91
 Although the Brown Shoe 
opinion included six citations to legal-economic scholarship, each of 
these citations supported interventionist conclusions, and none spoke di-
rectly to efficiency or consumer prices.
92
 At the time Brown Shoe was de-
cided, economic harm to competitors—in and of itself—tended to estab-
lish antitrust liability, with little thought to the economic consequences 
born by the ultimate consumer. 
 Indeed, despite the Court’s concern over market foreclosure, evi-
dence had been introduced that, following the acquisition, Brown con-
tinued to sell shoes to competing retailers and Kinney continued to buy 
shoes from competing manufacturers
93
—but that small, independent 
 
85
Id. at 317. 
86
Whether or not concentration in the shoe industry was actually increasing was 
disputed by the parties. See Brief for the United States at 99, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 
at 294 (No. 4); Brief for Appellant at 15, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S.at 294 (No. 4). The 
Court accepted the government’s argument that the Brown-Kinney merger 
represented incipient industry consolidation. 
87
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 328. 
88
Id. at 324. 
89
Id. at 332. 
90
Id. at 330–32. 
91
Id. at 331–33. 
92
Id. at 312 n.19, 330 n.50, 332 nn.55–57, 334 n.61, 343 n.71. 
93
Following the merger, Brown and Kinney continued to operate as separate 
business units. 
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firms had difficulty competing with the combined Brown-Kinney’s lower 
prices.
94
 Acknowledging the possibility that large, integrated firms such as 
Brown-Kinney might provide lower prices to consumers, the Court ex-
plicitly rejected consumer welfare as a controlling factor in Section 7 cas-
es.
95
 Turning again to the legislative history, the Court concluded that 
Congress’s objectives in passing the Celler-Kefauver amendments had 
been to protect small businesses, preserve economic autonomy, and 
maintain the existing “economic way of life” by halting trends toward in-
dustrial consolidation at their earliest incipiency.
96
 To the extent these 
goals conflicted with minimizing consumer prices, the Court determined 
that preventing concentration was Congress’s priority.
97
 In a famous pas-
sage, the Court at once recognized and deprecated the value of econom-
ic efficiency under the antitrust laws: 
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we 
cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition 
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned business. 
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might 
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. 
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentraliza-
tion. We must give effect to that decision.
98
 
 Whatever the economic merits of this ruling, and despite impas-
sioned arguments to the contrary,
99
 the Court’s interpretation of Con-
gressional intent was undoubtedly correct. The legislative history of the 
Celler-Kefauver amendments (and of the original Clayton Act itself) is 
replete with unambiguous statements of Congress’s anti-bigness, anti-
concentration agenda, and of its goal of halting even the earliest trends 
toward economic centralization.
100
 The Court’s interpretation was also 
consistent with the mainstream academic views of the era. Antitrust was 
seen by many legal academics as an important check on economic power, 
 
94
See Brief for United States, supra note 86, at 120–22. 
95
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 342, n.69. 
96
Id. at 333. 
97
Id. at 346.  
98
Id. 
99
See, e.g., Bork, supra note 1, at 200. Throughout his academic career, Bork 
argued that Congress’s primary objective in passing the antitrust laws was to maximize 
consumer welfare, rather than to protect small businesses and prevent economic 
concentration. In the Section 7 context (among others), this argument strains 
credulity. For a more measured critique of the Supreme Court’s use of legislative 
history in the Brown Shoe case, see Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 
of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1326–28 (1965). 
100
Thomas J. Horton, Fixing Merger Litigation “Fixes”: Reforming the Litigation of 
Proposed Merger Remedies Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 165, 191–94 
(2010); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 1, 23–26 (1982); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1051, 1060–65 (1979).  
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an equalitarian viewpoint complemented by the industrial organization 
economics of the period.
101
 At the time Brown Shoe was decided, Harvard-
style structuralism was the dominant approach in antitrust economics, 
while the revisionist arguments of the Chicago School remained under-
developed and obscure. The immaturity of the Chicago School in 1962 is 
evidenced by the surprising fact that the Court cited George Stigler in 
support of its interventionist, anti-concentration holding.
102
 The lack of 
alternatives to traditional, interventionist antitrust was also reflected in 
the parties’ briefs, in which the market-based arguments that would char-
acterize later antitrust cases are conspicuously absent. 
2. Plaintiff’s Arguments 
 The Court’s opinion generally followed the arguments of the gov-
ernment, which were even more explicit in prioritizing equalitarianism 
over efficiency. Most of the government’s arguments focused on Con-
gress’s anti-bigness agenda and the attendant importance of halting mo-
nopoly in its earliest incipiency.
103
 While the government’s brief included 
a total of five legal-economic citations (generally supporting its interven-
tionist theory of the case), efficiency and consumer prices were peripher-
al to its core arguments.
104
 
 The contradictions between the government’s arguments and the 
consumer welfare model are striking. Employing a legal strategy that 
would seem perverse by the standards of current antitrust thinking, the 
government repeatedly cited Brown-Kinney’s advantages in satisfying 
consumer demand as reasons to invalidate the merger. For example, ac-
cording to the government, the merger was unfair to Brown-Kinney’s 
competitors because the combined business could “sell its own product at 
a significantly lower price than the nonintegrated independent retail-
er.”
105
 The government also cited Brown’s own justifications for the mer-
 
101
See Emanuel Celler, What’s Wrong with “What Is Wrong with the Antitrust Laws?”, 
8 Antitrust Bull. 571, 593 (1963); Alfred E. Kahn, Market Power and Economic 
Growth: Guides to Public Policy, 8 Antitrust Bull. 531, 538 (1963).  
102
Two of the Court’s six legal-economic citations were to a 1955 Stigler article 
on the preventative role of merger policy. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 332 n.56, 334 
n.61. The government also cited Stigler in its merits brief. Brief for United States, 
supra note 86, at 97 n.35. Stigler would emerge in the 1960s as one of the leading 
economists of the Chicago School, but his early work emphasized the economic 
danger of industrial concentration. Although ironic in light of his later scholarship, 
Stigler’s (fleeting) anti-bigness views were consistent with an early Chicago 
intellectual tradition most fully expressed in the writing of Henry Simons. It was not 
until the work of Aaron Director in the 1950s (and its propagation by Bork, Stigler, 
and others in the 1960s) that Chicago became known for its free-market antitrust 
perspective. 
103
See Brief for United States, supra note 86, at 45. 
104
Id.  
105
Id. at 48. 
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ger,
106
 including a smoother manufacturing-retail cycle; more effective 
advertising and promotion; and greater flexibility to adjust styles, quality, 
and prices, as additional evidence of the merger’s illegality.
107
 
 During oral argument, the government (represented by Solicitor 
General Archibald Cox) tied its case to a larger goal of preserving the 
“economist’s classical free market.”
108
 This goal was expressed without any 
reference to actual economics scholarship, however—classical or other-
wise.
109
 In any event, the economic consequences of the “classical free 
market” seemed secondary within the logic of the government’s case to 
Congress’s “social philosophy” of protecting small businesses.
110
 Citing 
the language of the Ninth Circuit opinion in Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. 
F.T.C.,
111
 the government argued that “[as amended Section 7] was under 
consideration by Congress, it was duly appreciated that decentralized and 
deconcentrated markets are often uneconomic and provide higher costs 
and prices[,]” but that Congress chose to accept these costs to combat 
“concentration of power.”
112
 Although this argument was an accurate 
characterization of Congress’s legislative intent, it represented an eco-
nomic perspective far removed from current antitrust thought. As dis-
cussed in the context of the Sylvania and Brooke Group cases below, it is 
nearly inconceivable that a plaintiff would make such an argument today. 
3. Defendant’s Arguments 
 Unlike the government’s arguments, the defendant’s arguments in 
support of the merger gained little traction with the Court. This may 
have been partly the result of a misguided legal strategy: defendant’s 
counsel
113
 spent the majority of an over-200-page brief arguing that 
Brown and Kinney were not competitors—and therefore their merger 
did not threaten competition—because the two firms sold different varie-
ties of shoes in different price ranges.
114
 Although this argument was cer-
tainly relevant to the horizontal aspects of the case, it failed to impress 
the Court, which rejected it almost out of hand.
115
 At a deeper level, de-
 
106
Brown’s president, Clark Gamble, testified as a witness at trial. 
107
Brief for United States, supra note 86, at 120–22. 
108
Transcript of Oral Argument (Part 1) at 1:16:42, Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) ((No. 4), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/ 
1961_4. 
109
Id. at 1:16:06–1:19:38. 
110
Id. at 1:36:26. 
111
296 F.2d 800, 825 (9th Cir. 1961). 
112
Transcript of Oral Argument (Part 1), supra note 108, at 1:37. 
113
Brown’s lead attorney was Arthur Dean, of Sullivan & Cromwell—hardly 
incompetent antitrust counsel. 
114
Brief for Appellant, supra note 80, at 122. 
115
Transcript of Oral Argument (Part 2) at :06–2:23, Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 
294 (No. 4), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961. Defendant’s counsel 
argued that the shoe market was actually comprised of a large number of distinct and 
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fense counsel seemed unable to effectively convey why any merger should 
be viewed by courts with anything besides hostility. This broader theoret-
ical failure may have stemmed from an absence—at the time—of market-
based antitrust scholarship for defendant’s counsel to draw on. 
 At certain points in its briefs,
116
 the defense broached arguments 
similar to those that would eventually become hallmarks of the Chicago 
School, but without the aura of economic sophistication that academic 
citations might have afforded. As an example, the defense argued that 
the government’s case conflated injury to competitors with injury to competi-
tion, and that evidence of Brown’s competitive success was irrelevant to 
establishing antitrust liability (themes common to later Chicago scholar-
ship).
117
 Despite the economic implications of this argument, however, 
defendant’s briefs included no citations to law and economics scholar-
ship.
118
 Without the benefit of a theoretical model of how mergers could 
promote economic efficiency, the defense was incapable of rebutting the 
assumption that all mergers were competitively suspect. Ironically, the 
defense went as far as to argue the merger would not achieve economic 
benefits—even for Brown itself!—in an attempt to counter the govern-
ment’s claims as to Brown’s competitive advantages.
119
 Given the inability 
of the defendant to coherently justify its own transaction, it is hardly sur-
prising that it fared so poorly before the Court. 
4. Summary 
 The Brown Shoe case is representative of its era in at least three key 
respects: (1) the Court’s opinion focused on protecting competitors ra-
ther than maximizing consumer welfare, (2) the logic of the parties’ ar-
guments did not rely on formal economic theory, and (3) neither the 
Court’s opinion nor the parties’ briefs contained extensive citations to 
law and economics scholarship.
120
 Although modern critics have de-
 
separate submarkets (corresponding with different varieties of shoes and different 
price ranges). The Court held that, for purposes of the case, there were only three 
identifiable markets: men’s shoes, women’s shoes, and children’s shoes. Both Justice 
Clark (concurring) and Justice Harlan (dissenting) would have taken an even stricter 
approach, holding that the shoe industry was comprised of a single market. 
116
The defendant submitted an initial brief and a reply brief. 
117
Brief for Appellant, supra note 80; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 38, Brown Shoe 
Co., 370 U.S. at 294 (No. 4). Interestingly, the Court’s statement that the Clayton Act 
was meant to protect “competition, not competitors”—a phrase which would later 
become a touchstone of modern antitrust—appears to have been drawn from the 
initial brief of the defendant. It appears nowhere in the legislative history of the 
Celler-Kefauver amendments. 
118
Brief for Appellant, supra note 80. 
119
Id. at 193. 
120
At six and five citations respectively, the Court’s opinion and the plaintiff’s 
merits brief were each above average for the era, but well below average for all cases 
in the database. The defendant’s merits briefs included no law and economic 
citations. 
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nounced Brown Shoe as economically naive, it is important to remember 
that the decision reflected the mainstream antitrust views of the era. The 
moderate, consensus nature of the Brown Shoe decision is underscored by 
the facts that the government’s case was originally brought under a Re-
publican administration,
121
 that the Court’s opinion was authored by a 
Republican Chief Justice,
122
 and that the decision on the merits was essen-
tially unanimous.
123
 Claims that the decision constituted a dramatic, activ-
ist overreach are both inaccurate and ahistorical. 
 Brown Shoe is also representative for another important reason: like 
most antitrust cases of its era, it featured no involvement of amici curiae. 
Amicus briefs were rarely submitted in antitrust cases before the 1970s. 
Although the historical phenomenon of increasing amicus briefs has af-
fected nearly every area of the law, it may have been particularly influen-
tial in the antitrust context. As law and economics scholarship began to 
criticize traditional antitrust jurisprudence, amicus briefs were often the 
means by which these critiques were communicated to the Court.
124
 
 Significantly, it was not until after Brown Shoe had been decided that 
market-based antitrust scholarship became widely published. The deci-
sion itself may have even played a role in spurring the publication of 
market-based critiques: Robert Bork and Ward Bowman’s 1963 Fortune 
article “The Crisis in Antitrust”—the opening salvo of both professors’ 
career-spanning assaults on interventionist antitrust—was written partly 
in response to the Brown Shoe decision, which they saw as symptomatic of 
incoherent antitrust jurisprudence.
125
 The critique outlined in “The Crisis 
in Antitrust” would grow increasingly influential as the years went by, and 
antitrust law and enforcement policy would eventually gravitate toward 
the Chicago perspective. Brown Shoe, therefore, stands today as a high-
water mark of interventionist antitrust, largely disconnected from the 
economic concerns of the current intellectual paradigm. 
 
121
The case was originally brought in 1955, under the Eisenhower 
administration. 
122
Albeit the single most interventionist Justice of the postwar era. See supra 
Figure 9. 
123
Although Justice Harlan dissented on a procedural jurisdictional issue, he 
concurred with the Court’s decision on the merits. Justice Frankfurter and Justice 
White took no part in the decision of the case. For discussion of the Court’s internal 
decision-making process in Brown Shoe, see Tony A. Freyer, What Was Warren Court 
Antitrust?, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 347, 370–81. 
124
See, for example, the discussion of Sylvania, infra Part III.B. 
125
Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, Fortune, 1963, at 
138, reprinted in 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1965). 
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B. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.—The Economic Turn in 
Antitrust 
 The Sylvania case is widely considered a turning point in modern 
antitrust. Its economics-based, pro-defendant holding and its explicit 
break from prior Court precedent signaled a new perspective on the part 
of the Court toward the appropriate role of antitrust law. Although Sylva-
nia was not the first decision to apply economic analysis to antitrust law, 
its clear endorsement of market-based economic theory heralded the fu-
ture direction of the field. Andrew Gavil speaks for most commentators 
when he writes that, after Sylvania, “a revolution unfolded in the content 
of the law of antitrust.”
126
 
 Sylvania concerned the legality of non-price vertical sales restraints 
imposed by manufacturers on independent retailers—a different subject 
than raised in Brown Shoe, but implicating similar social, political, and 
economic concerns. Ten years prior to Sylvania, the Court had held in 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. that a manufacturer’s practice of re-
stricting the sales activities of wholesalers and retailers was a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.
127
 GTE Sylvania, Inc., a television manufacturer, 
engaged in distribution practices similar to those held illegal in Schwinn, 
restricting the locations from which its authorized dealers were allowed 
sell its products.
128
 One of these dealers sued Sylvania after attempting to 
sell its products from an unauthorized location, in competition with the 
authorized Sylvania dealer for the area.
129
 Applying Schwinn, the district 
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
130
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit (sit-
ting en banc) reversed the decision of the district court, distinguishing 
the facts of Sylvania’s distribution practices from the practices held un-
lawful in Schwinn.
131
 Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court went even 
further, holding that non-price vertical sales restraints were subject to the 
rule of reason (rather than the per se rule), expressly overruling 
Schwinn.
132
 According to the Court’s opinion, although vertical restraints 
such as those employed by Sylvania could reduce competition among 
dealers of the same brand (so-called “intrabrand” competition), this was 
 
126
Gavil, supra note 4, at 8. 
127
388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967). Schwinn, a bicycle manufacturer, had secured 
agreements from its wholesalers not to sell outside of their assigned geographic areas, 
as well as agreements from its retailers to sell only to retail customers (and not to sell 
to other unauthorized resellers). These practices were intended to reduce 
competition among wholesalers and retailers, increasing the price of Schwinn 
products and encouraging retailers to invest in promotional and service efforts. 
128
Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 38 (1977). 
129
Id. at 39. 
130
Id. at 40. 
131
Id. at 41. 
132
Id. at 57. 
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more than offset by encouraging competition among manufacturers of 
competing brands ( “interbrand” competition).
133
 
 Like Brown Shoe, Sylvania is a representative example of many anti-
trust decisions of its era—in this case, the transitional period of the late 
1970s and 1980s. Specifically, Sylvania demonstrates the following charac-
teristics common to many cases of the period: (1) the decisive role of 
conservative Justices (particularly Justice Powell, the author of the Sylva-
nia opinion); (2) extensive citation to law and economics scholarship on 
the part of the Court; (3) extensive citation to law and economics schol-
arship on the part of the defendant; (4) a relative lack of law and eco-
nomics citations on the part of the plaintiff; and (5) the submission of 
multiple economically-sophisticated amicus briefs. Together, these char-
acteristics clearly distinguish Sylvania from earlier cases such as Brown 
Shoe and Schwinn. Although a full analysis of the Sylvania decision—one 
of the most important in recent antitrust history—is beyond the scope of 
this Article, the discussion below highlights the ways in which Sylvania il-
lustrates overarching trends.
134
 
1. The Court’s Opinion 
 The Sylvania opinion provides a clear example of the impact of Nix-
on’s judicial appointees (particularly Justice Powell) on U.S. antitrust ju-
risprudence. Powell—the opinion’s author—purposefully crafted a far-
reaching decision that extended well beyond the facts of the case, over-
turning prior Court precedent and reshaping the law of vertical re-
straints. Much of Powell’s discussion in Sylvania actually focused on criti-
cizing Schwinn, clearly telegraphing his desire to overrule it.
135
 After 
finding Sylvania’s distribution practices indistinguishable from those in 
Schwinn, Powell justified overruling the prior case on grounds of its fun-
damental doctrinal weakness; its confused, inconsistent application by 
the lower courts; and its overwhelmingly negative reception by academic 
commentators.
136
 This last factor appears to have been particularly signif-
icant, as the opinion cites the academic literature extensively—in total, 
 
133
Id. at 51–52. 
134
For broader analyses of Sylvania, see generally Warren S. Grimes, The Life Cycle 
of a Venerable Precedent: GTE Sylvania and the Future of Vertical Restraints Law, 17 
Antitrust L.J. 27 (2002); Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-
Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1978); Robert L. Steiner, Sylvania 
Economics—A Critique, 60 Antitrust L.J. 41 (1991). 
135
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 47, 51, 54, 56. 
136
Schwinn is among the most criticized opinions in the history of antitrust law. 
Its per se result had not been advocated by the plaintiff, but was rather a confusing 
consequence of Justice Fortas’ widely panned opinion. Even a noted critic of the 
Chicago treatment of vertical restraints has identified Schwinn as an example of “bad 
workman-ship, sloppy use of terms, and a persistent failure to examine the reasons 
why the decision might be criticized.” Peter C. Carstensen, Annual Survey of Antitrust 
Developments: 1976–1977, 35 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 16 (1978). 
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Powell’s opinion includes 24 citations to law and economics scholarship, 
compared to only six in Brown Shoe and zero in Schwinn. 
 These citations provided the basis of the opinion’s economic analy-
sis of vertical restraints, which posited that manufacturers imposed such 
restraints not to reduce retail competition and uphold prices, but rather 
to ensure effective product distribution and more effectively compete 
with rival manufacturers. Although vertical restraints reduced intrabrand 
competition by limiting competition among dealers of the same brand, 
they enhanced interbrand competition by encouraging dealers of compet-
ing brands to invest in promotion, merchandising, and point-of-sale ser-
vices.
137
 The logic of this argument was deeply influenced by recent de-
velopments in antitrust scholarship, particularly (though not exclusively) 
the work of scholars associated with the Chicago School. Citing Richard 
Posner, Robert Bork, and other prominent antitrust scholars, the opin-
ion argued that manufacturers have an economic interest in ensuring the 
maximum level of dealer competition consistent with the efficient distri-
bution of their products. Thus, vertical restrictions imposed by manufac-
turers are unlikely to have net anti-competitive effects—particularly not 
to an extent justifying inflexible per se treatment.
138
 
 Although the logic of the Court’s opinion relied heavily on econom-
ic theory, it is difficult to say whether law and economics scholarship ac-
tually influenced Sylvania’s outcome. There is abundant evidence that 
Justice Powell needed little convincing to overrule Schwinn.
139
 Powell had 
arrived on the Court in 1972 with considerable pro-business sympathies, 
as suggested by his prior experience as a successful corporate attorney, 
his service on several corporate boards of directors, and his consistent 
pro-business voting record following his appointment.
140
 In addition, only 
two months prior to his nomination, Powell had authored the infamous 
“Powell memorandum” to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a program-
matic call for the defense of the American free enterprise system.
141
 This 
confidential memorandum, revealed after Powell’s confirmation, warned 
of growing hostility in American culture to the capitalist economic system 
 
137
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54−57. 
138
Id. at 58. This is a necessarily simplified description of the economic 
arguments of Sylvania, which are no doubt familiar to many readers. For more 
detailed treatments of the Court’s arguments, see Grimes, supra note 134, at 27; 
Pitofsky, supra note 134, at 1; Steiner, supra note 134, at 41. 
139
See A. C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the 
Federal Securities Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 841, 845 (2003).  
140
Powell’s pro-business voting record was not limited to antitrust cases. For 
example, he was also one of the most pro-defendant Justices in securities cases, 
spearheading a rollback of many Warren Court decisions during the 1970s and 1980s. 
See id. 
141
Lewis F. Powell, Confidential Memorandum: Attack on American Free 
Enterprise System (1971), http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/ 
PowellMemorandumPrinted.pdf. 
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and advocated concerted efforts to spread pro-capitalist ideas among 
universities, the media, and—most significantly—the courts.
142
 Whether 
or not the Powell memorandum is proof of a premeditated judicial 
agenda, as some critics of Powell have claimed, it is safe to say Powell’s 
connections to the business world likely influenced his antitrust views. 
 As an example, Powell’s dissatisfaction with Schwinn (and the broad-
er inhospitality tradition it represented) influenced nearly all aspects of 
the Sylvania case. Indeed, without Powell’s intervention in the certiorari 
process, the Court may never have heard Sylvania at all. As documented 
by Andrew Gavil, Powell’s historical papers reveal that the Court’s initial 
vote on granting certiorari attracted only three of the four Justices neces-
sary to accept the case.
143
 However, Powell requested a special relisting, 
and lobbied fellow Justices to change their votes, successfully persuading 
Justice Stewart.
144
 As the Ninth Circuit below had already ruled for Sylva-
nia, Powell’s motivation to hear the case was clearly to revisit Schwinn. 
Once the case had been heard by the Court, Powell worked behind the 
scenes during the opinion-drafting process to ensure that Schwinn would 
be expressly overruled, strategically tailoring the language of his opinion 
to ensure the support of fellow Justices.
145
 Powell was highly conscious of 
both the jurisprudential and economic significance of reversing the per 
se treatment of vertical restraints, instructing his clerks to clearly articu-
late why Schwinn was both doctrinally and economically unsound.
146
 
Ultimately, Powell’s personal decision to overrule Schwinn was likely 
made independent of economic theory. Nevertheless, economic theory 
was the intellectual framework within which the decision was articulated 
and justified. As discussed below, the economic content of the Sylvania 
opinion was drawn from multiple sources—partly from the contributions 
of Powell’s clerks, partly from the defendant’s merits brief, and partly 
from amicus briefs (particularly that of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association).
147
 The plaintiff’s briefs,
148
 on the other hand, which relied 
 
142
Id. For discussion of the historical context and influence of the Powell 
memorandum, see Kimberly Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s 
Crusade Against the New Deal 150–65 (2010). The memorandum is “infamous” 
primarily among liberal advocacy groups, which see it as an inspiration for the 
conservative intellectual mobilization of the 1970s and 1980s. 
143
Gavil, supra note 4, at 9. 
144
Id. Pursuant to the informal “rule of four,” the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari upon the affirmative vote of at least four Justices.  
145
Id. at 9–10. In the final tally, Blackmun, Burger, Stevens, and Stewart joined 
Powell’s opinion, with White concurring. Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, which 
Marshall joined. Rehnquist took no part in the case. 
146
Id. at 10. 
147
The Court’s reasoning was not drawn from any expression of Congressional 
intent, statutory or otherwise. The remarkable activism of Justice Powell (and the 
Court more generally) in shaping and reshaping antitrust doctrine may be an 
example of what Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller have referred to as 
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primarily on stare decisis, were largely disregarded by the Court’s opin-
ion, despite their firmer grounding in legal precedent. 
2. Plaintiff’s Arguments 
 The various Sylvania briefs and their different approaches to the 
case highlight the vigorous intellectual debates occurring in antitrust 
scholarship in the late 1970s. On the side of interventionist antitrust, the 
plaintiff was represented by Lawrence Sullivan and Jesse Choper, law pro-
fessors at Berkeley and proponents of strict, per se treatment of vertical 
restraints.
149
 Sullivan in particular was an outspoken defender of tradi-
tional antitrust, and one of the Chicago School’s most prominent and re-
spected intellectual opponents.
150
 Despite Sullivan’s academic engage-
ment with the economic debates of the day, however, he failed to 
connect his legal arguments to the expanding economic literature, rely-
ing instead on a more traditional, precedent-based legal strategy.
151
 
 Together, the plaintiff’s briefs included a total of nine citations to 
law and economics scholarship, compared to thirty-one in the defend-
ant’s single merits brief.
152
 Moreover, most of these citations were actually 
negative citations refuting the arguments of the cited scholar.
153
 Rather 
than drawing on economic support, the plaintiff’s arguments against Syl-
vania’s distribution practices were primarily grounded in Court prece-
dent—namely Schwinn. 
154
 This may have been a reasonable strategy given 
Schwinn’s clear application to the facts, but it left the plaintiff with little to 
stand on in the event that Schwinn were overruled.
155
 Instead of focusing 
on economic efficiency, the plaintiff emphasized the broader concerns 
that had animated earlier antitrust cases, arguing that per se prohibition 
of vertical restraints ensured “fair and rational income distribution,” “an 
economic climate in which any person can aspire to independence and 
growth[,]” and the “[d]ispersion of political, social and economic pow-
er.”
156
 These non-efficiency arguments had little impact on the Court’s 
majority, and were summarily disposed of in a footnote in Powell’s opin-
ion: “Competitive economies have social and political as well as economic 
 
“antitrust’s democracy deficit”—that is, the displacement of Congressional 
policymaking by that of unelected institutions. Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, 
Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2543, 2544 (2013).  
148
The plaintiff submitted an initial brief and a reply brief. 
149
Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977). 
150
Jesse H. Choper, Tribute: Retirement of Lawrence Sullivan, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 1221, 
1221 (1991). 
151
Brief for Petitioners, GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (No. 76-15), 1976 WL 
181221. 
152
Id. at iv–v.  
153
Citing Bork in the context of arguing that Bork is wrong, for example. 
154
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 151, at 29, 37, 41. 
155
See Carstensen, supra note 136, at 23–24. 
156
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 151, at 55. 
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advantages,” he wrote, “but an antitrust policy divorced from market con-
siderations would lack any objective benchmarks.”
157
 
 Sullivan and Choper’s legal strategy was typical of many antitrust 
plaintiffs during this period. The emphasis on legal precedent rather 
than economic efficiency, the appeal to traditional notions of economic 
equality, and the relative dearth of law and economics citations were 
traits seen again and again in plaintiff’s briefs up to the 1980s. For many 
years, this had been a successful approach. Following the Nixon ap-
pointments, however, this strategy became much less viable, as market-
based defendants’ arguments began to win a greater number of cases. 
3. Defendant’s Arguments 
 The defendant’s brief was characteristic of emerging trends in anti-
trust practice in that it extended beyond traditional legal analysis to pro-
vide an economic justification for Sylvania’s business practices.
158
 Defend-
ant’s counsel supported its arguments with a total of 31 law and 
economics citations (compared to the plaintiff’s nine), the vast majority 
of which were consistent with the Chicago position on vertical re-
straints.
159
 The defendant’s brief also incorporated testimony of Lee Pres-
ton, Jr., an economics professor at Berkeley, to the effect that Sylvania’s 
use of vertical restraints was more likely to promote competition than to 
harm it.
160
 Preston’s testimony was grounded in a decidedly market-
oriented economic perspective, according to which the self-interested 
distribution decisions of independent manufacturers such as Sylvania 
would—almost by definition—benefit consumers as well.
161
 A majority of 
the Court apparently agreed, as many of the defendant’s economic ar-
guments were reflected in Powell’s final opinion. Sylvania’s brief is thus 
representative of many defendant’s briefs of the period: grounded in 
economics, supported by academic citations, and addressed toward an 
increasingly receptive Court. 
4. Amicus Curiae Briefs 
 Sylvania provides an early example of another important trend in 
antitrust practice—the increasing number of economically sophisticated 
amicus curiae briefs. In Sylvania, three amici submitted legal briefs 
(compared to zero in Brown Shoe and one in Schwinn), each in support of 
the defendant. All three briefs included economic arguments, but one in 
particular—submitted by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association 
 
157
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 53 n.21. 
158
See generally Brief for Respondent, GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (No. 76-
15), 1976 WL 181222. 
159
Id. at 5–6.  
160
Id. at 10. 
161
See Carstensen, supra note 136, at 29–30. 
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(“MVMA”)—made a particularly strong impression on the Court, per-
haps even more so than the defendant’s brief itself.
162
 
 The MVMA brief was authored by Donald Turner, counsel to 
MVMA, together with the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.
163
 In 
1977, Turner was among the most prominent and respected antitrust 
scholars in America. Holding a law degree and a Ph.D. in economics 
(both from Harvard), Turner had served as Assistant Attorney General 
for antitrust under President Johnson, and his multivolume antitrust 
treatise, co-authored with Phillip Areeda, was (and remains) the single 
most cited publication in the field.
164
 Although trained at Harvard, 
Turner’s views on antitrust policy—always informed by economic analy-
sis—became increasingly aligned with the Chicago perspective over the 
course of his career. His MVMA brief was for all intents and purposes an 
economic essay on vertical restraints, citing many prominent figures of 
the Chicago School and arriving at substantially similar conclusions.
165
 
 The MVMA brief was particularly well received by Powell and his 
clerks. During the opinion drafting process, Powell advised his clerks to 
use the MVMA brief as inspiration: “[m]y recollection is that the brief 
filed by Wilmer Cutler is the single most helpful brief in this case”, he 
wrote to them. “No doubt you have drawn on it heavily. If not, I com-
mend it to you.”
166
 Tyler Baker, one of Powell’s clerks, was as impressed 
by the MVMA brief as his boss. Discussing the case with Andrew Gavil, 
Baker recalled that “the Wilmer Cutler brief was head and shoulders 
above anything else we had. It really was a masterful brief that was clearly 
 
162
Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief for Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association as Amicus Curiae, GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (No. 76-15), 1977 WL 
189274 [hereinafter MVMA Brief]. The two other amicus briefs were submitted by 
the Associated Equipment Distributors and the International Franchise Association. 
163
The precise division of labor between Turner and Wilmer Cutler is unclear, 
though given the brief’s high level of economic sophistication, it is reasonable to 
assume that Turner’s contribution was significant. Turner subsequently joined 
Wilmer Cutler as counsel, suggesting their working relationship was very close.  
164
The current iteration of the Areeda-Turner treatise, now helmed by Herbert 
Hovenkamp, is Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application (4th ed. 2015). 
165
MVMA Brief, supra note 162 at iv. One important difference between the 
position of the MVMA brief and that of the Chicago School was whether vertical price 
restraints (i.e., retail price maintenance) serve the same economic function as vertical 
non-price restraints (such as the policies at issue in both Sylvania and Schwinn). 
Although many Chicago scholars believed that vertical price restraints and vertical 
non-price restraints are equivalent from an economic perspective, and thus equally 
deserving of rule-of-reason analysis, the MVMA brief explicitly disclaimed any support 
for vertical price restraints, stating they tend to uphold prices and “plainly disserve 
the interests of many if not most consumers.” Id. at 45. 
166
Gavil, supra note 4, at 11. 
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written and yet had all the policy arguments included.”
167
 This is not to 
say that the MVMA brief persuaded Powell to decide one way or another—
it seems likely that Powell’s mind was made up even before the certiorari 
process—but it does suggest that the brief helped shape the analysis used 
to justify the decision. This analysis, in turn, has had far-reaching juris-
prudential implications. Indeed, the MVMA brief is probably unusual in 
the degree of influence it had on the law.
168
 It nonetheless serves to illus-
trate a more general trend in antitrust cases—the rise of economics-based 
amicus briefs authored by prominent antitrust scholars. In the decades 
following the Sylvania decision, this trend has only intensified. 
5. Summary 
 Sylvania represents a transition period between two eras of antitrust: 
the mid-century inhospitality era, marked by aggressive interventionism, 
and the modern era of market-based antitrust, marked by faith in the ef-
ficiency of private ordering. Sylvania heralded the modern era with its de-
tailed economic arguments and extensive law and economics citations. 
These characteristics distinguished Sylvania from earlier cases such as 
Brown Shoe and Schwinn, in which economics played a minor role. Sylva-
nia remains connected to the earlier era as well, however, particularly in 
terms of the legal strategy employed by plaintiff’s counsel. Although the 
decision to focus on legal precedent rather than abstract economic theo-
ry was clearly the wrong one, it was not until the 1980s that plaintiffs be-
gan to regularly use economic arguments. The absence of any amicus cu-
riae supporting the plaintiff reflects a similar lag—later cases would 
feature economics-based amicus briefs on both sides. 
 Perhaps the most notable feature of Sylvania is the activism of Justice 
Powell. This aspect of the case raises difficult questions regarding the in-
fluence of law and economics scholarship, highlighting the historical 
ambiguity at the very heart of this study. It is clear that Powell—together 
with his clerks—accepted the economic arguments of Sylvania and 
MVMA, given that he incorporated them into the Court’s opinion. How-
ever, it appears equally clear that Powell’s fundamental decision to over-
rule Schwinn (and to hear the case at all) was dictated primarily by his po-
litical attitudes. Ultimately, the true significance of law and economics 
scholarship as employed in the Sylvania case may have been in persuad-
ing marginal Justices (Stevens and Stewart, for example) to join Powell’s 
opinion, as well as in enshrining Chicago vertical restraint analysis as au-
 
167
Id. at 13 n.31. Baker himself was almost certainly an important factor in 
shaping the Sylvania opinion. Baker came to his clerkship after having studied under 
William F. Baxter at Stanford Law School, and went on to work for Baxter at the 
Department of Justice in the early 1980s. Baxter was a committed adherent of the 
Chicago approach to antitrust, a perspective shared by his student Baker. See id. 
168
In the words of Stephen Calkins, most amicus briefs in antitrust cases “sparkle 
briefly and then expire, forgotten if not unnoticed.” Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust 
Conversation, 68 Antitrust L.J. 625, 643 (2001). 
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thoritative Supreme Court precedent. Through its citations to the Chica-
go School and its explicit endorsement of market-based economics, the 
Sylvania opinion put litigants on notice that the foundations of antitrust 
were beginning to change. 
C. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.—A New 
Era 
 Brooke Group, my third and final case study, demonstrates the tri-
umph of economic analysis in U.S. antitrust law. In this 1993 case, 
Brooke Group Ltd.,
169
 a cigarette manufacturer, brought a predatory pric-
ing claim under the Robinson-Patman Act
170
 against Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., a competing manufacturer. Brooke Group claimed that 
Brown & Williamson had priced its generic cigarettes below cost in an at-
tempt to undermine Brooke Group’s competitive efforts and maintain 
oligopolistic pricing in the cigarette industry.
171
 The Court ruled in favor 
of Brown & Williamson, relying on a market-based theory of predatory 
pricing.
172
 What is most notable about Brooke Group is not the outcome of 
the case (market-based decisions had become the norm by the early 
1990s), but rather the similar analytical perspectives of plaintiff’s and de-
fendant’s counsel. Both sides agreed that consumer welfare was the dis-
positive analytical issue, and even agreed on the specific economic test to 
be used in predatory pricing cases.
173
 In an antitrust “clash of the titans,” 
plaintiff and defendant were represented by two of the most famous 
scholars in the field, Phillip Areeda and Robert Bork, respectively.
174
 
Areeda’s association with the Harvard tradition and Bork’s association 
with Chicago underscores the significance of their intellectual agree-
ment, and illustrates the convergence of antitrust scholarship on a fun-
 
169
Formerly known as Liggett Group Inc. 
170
The case was brought under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the 
Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). Like the Court and most 
commentators, I refer to this provision simply as the “Robinson-Patman Act.” The 
Robinson-Patman Act forbids price discrimination “where the effect of such 
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 
discrimination, or with customers of either of them.” Id. Brooke Group claimed that 
Brown & Williamson had used price discrimination as a means of implementing 
predatory pricing. In the legal context, the term “predatory pricing” generally refers 
to pricing intended to drive a competitor from the marketplace. The vagueness of 
this concept (and its potential for encompassing otherwise legitimate competition) is 
one of the reasons for cases such as Brooke Group. 
171
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 212 
(1993). 
172
Id. at 243. 
173
Id. at 222. 
174
Id. at 211.  
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damentally economic perspective. Plaintiff and defendant’s mutual ac-
ceptance of the consumer welfare vision of antitrust and their concomi-
tant rejection of any broader, non-economic policy goals represented the 
culmination of a paradigm shift in antitrust law. 
1. The Court’s Opinion 
 The Brooke Group opinion bears many of the characteristics of con-
temporary antitrust decisions. Its ruling for the defendant was firmly 
grounded in market-based economics, and reflected the skepticism of 
many economists as to the prevalence and feasibility of predatory pricing. 
Among its many law and economics citations—31 in total—the opinion 
relied especially on a 1975 article by Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, 
in which the authors criticized the traditionalist understanding of preda-
tory pricing.
175
 Areeda and Turner argued that true predatory pricing was 
rarely attempted and even more rarely successful, and that a legal claim 
of predatory pricing should therefore require two factors: (1) evidence 
that the alleged predator had priced below average variable cost and (2) 
a likelihood of subsequent recoupment of the predator’s losses through 
supracompetitive pricing.
176
 Without these two elements, Areeda and 
Turner argued, so-called “predatory pricing” was more likely vigorous 
price competition, which benefited consumers.
177
 The Areeda-Turner 
analysis was highly influential even before Brooke Group, having already 
been adopted (in various forms) by most of the circuit courts of appeal.
178
 
Although the Court’s Brooke Group opinion did not explicitly endorse the 
Areeda-Turner test, it established a similar burden, holding that a plain-
tiff alleging predatory pricing must show that the defendant (1) priced 
below “an appropriate measure” of its costs and (2) had a reasonable 
prospect of recoupment.
179
 
This holding imposed substantial obstacles in the way of predatory 
pricing claims, reinforcing decisions from the 1980s such as Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc.
180
 and Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
 
175
See generally Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related 
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975). 
176
Although Areeda and Turner’s 1975 article is most commonly associated with 
the average variable cost test, it also set forth the recoupment requirement. See 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Predatory Pricing Under the Areeda-Turner Test 1 (Univ. Iowa Legal 
Stud. Research Paper No. 15-06, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2422120. 
177
Areeda & Turner, supra note 175. 
178
See Hovenkamp, supra note 176, at 1. 
179
See Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 222–26. The Court did not explicitly endorse 
Areeda and Turner’s below-average-variable-cost test, instead requiring the less 
specific “appropriate measure of cost” test. However, the below-average-variable-cost 
test was agreed to by the parties and was actually the cost test used in the case. 
180
479 U.S. 104, 105 (1986). 
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Corp.,
181
 which had also relied on law and economics scholarship in deny-
ing predatory pricing allegations.
182
 In addition, Brooke Group distin-
guished (and effectively emasculated) the 1967 case of Utah Pie Co. v. 
Continental Baking Co., the leading case in which the Court had ruled in 
favor of a plaintiff claiming predatory pricing.
183
 Although Utah Pie was 
not expressly overruled, it clearly belonged to another era. Emphasizing 
that the antitrust laws were for “the protection of competition, not com-
petitors” (citing, ironically, Brown Shoe), Brooke Group affirmed the Court’s 
modern hostility to predatory pricing claims.
184
 
2. Plaintiff’s Arguments 
 In many ways, the most interesting aspect of Brooke Group is the na-
ture of the plaintiff’s arguments. Unlike the cases of the Warren Court 
era, in which economic theory was largely absent, or the transitional cases 
of the 1970s, in which plaintiffs were outflanked by defendants’ econom-
ic arguments, Brooke Group featured substantial agreement between the 
parties as to the fundamentally economic nature of the case. Specifically, 
both parties accepted the Areeda-Turner test for legally cognizable pred-
atory pricing: pricing by the defendant below its average variable costs, 
with a reasonable prospect of subsequent recoupment. This adoption of 
an economically rigorous standard was a major departure from plaintiffs’ 
arguments in earlier predatory pricing cases.
185
 The fact that Brooke 
Group was represented by Areeda—coauthor of the test—only highlight-
ed the extent to which antitrust had evolved.
186
 
Like the Chicago approach to predatory pricing, the Areeda-Turner 
test is grounded in a consumer-welfare model of antitrust, meaning that 
the plaintiff’s arguments necessarily acknowledged that low prices were 
only “predatory” if they resulted in economic harm to consumers.
187
 
Thus, although plaintiff’s counsel claimed the defendant’s arguments 
exalted economic theory over economic facts,
188
 the two parties’ theoreti-
cal perspectives were actually very similar. Tacitly disclaiming Utah Pie, 
which had focused on defendants’ “intent” of injuring a competitor, the 
plaintiff accepted the more demanding burden of showing both below-
 
181
475 U.S. 574, 594–95 (1986). 
182
Although Cargill and Matsushita were significantly different cases (Cargill 
concerned a merger while Matsushita concerned an alleged predatory pricing 
conspiracy), both cases involved claims of predatory pricing. See Cargill, 479 U.S., at 
107; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 578. 
183
See Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 688 (1967). 
184
Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 224. 
185
See Utah Pie Co., 386 U.S. at 698. 
186
Areeda served as plaintiff’s counsel together with his Harvard Law School 
colleague, Charles Fried. 
187
See Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 225. 
188
See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209 (No. 92-
466), 1993 WL 290103. 
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cost pricing and likelihood of recoupment.
189
 This was identical to the 
test proposed by defendant’s counsel. The primary point of disagreement 
between the parties was not the appropriate economic analysis, but 
whether the plaintiff had met its evidentiary burden.
190
 Unlike plaintiffs 
in many earlier cases, Brooke Group’s counsel directly engaged with the 
defendant’s economic arguments, devoting substantial effort to contest-
ing its claim that a decision for the plaintiff would chill legitimate price 
competition.
191
 Finally, not only did the plaintiff’s arguments focus on 
consumer prices, they also dispensed with the equalitarian appeals that 
had long been a staple of antitrust cases. Plaintiff’s full acceptance of the 
consumer-welfare model, its reliance on economic analysis, and its ability 
to engage the Chicago School on its own intellectual terms reveal the ma-
jor changes in antitrust practice since the cases of the1960s. 
3. Defendant’s Arguments 
 Just as Brooke Group was represented by one of the country’s most 
prominent antitrust scholars, so too was Brown & Williamson. Defense 
counsel included not only Robert Bork, a leading figure of the Chicago 
School, but also Bork’s friend and former law partner Frederick Rowe, a 
noted antitrust scholar in his own right and longtime critic of the Robin-
son-Patman Act.
192
 Unsurprisingly, Bork and Rowe’s defense of Brown & 
Williamson’s pricing practices featured the consumer-welfare philosophy 
and market-based economic analysis typical of the Chicago School. More 
surprising was how much their arguments shared in common with the 
plaintiff’s. Although their characterizations of the factual evidence (the 
true area of contention in the case) were very different, both parties en-
dorsed the same analytical test for legally cognizable predatory pricing.
193
 
 
189
This acceptance could not have been more explicit: “We accept the burden of 
showing that prices were discriminatory, below average variable cost, and were 
undertaken with a reasonable prospect of recoupment.” Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 3:13, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209 (No. 92-466), http://www. 
oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_92_466. 
190
Brooke Group’s failure to meet this burden was partly due to the testimony of 
its own managers. Central to plaintiff’s theory of liability was its claim that the highly-
concentrated cigarette industry was characterized by tacit price collusion. Brooke 
Group management had repeatedly testified that no such collusion existed, however, 
contradicting plaintiff’s economic witness. Defense counsel seized on this 
contradictory testimony, Bork exclaiming: “I don’t see how a company can come 
in . . . the client itself can walk in and deny its own case, and then the lawyers say yes, 
but I have an economist over here that will . . . contradict. That just doesn’t make any 
sense to me.” Id. at 46:28. 
191
See Brief for the Petitioner at 28–32, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209 (No. 92-
466), 1992 WL 541265; Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 188, at 41–43. 
192
Years earlier, Bork and Rowe had practiced antitrust law at the firm today 
known as Kirkland & Ellis LLP. 
193
This was certainly the defense’s view. During oral argument, when Justice 
Kennedy observed “[t]here’s no legal difference between you and the petitioner,” 
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 The arguments of defendant’s counsel were actually fairly re-
strained, considering Bork’s strong market-based views: For example, de-
fendant’s counsel drew short of arguing that an independent oligopolist 
such as Brown & Williamson could never successfully recoup su-
pracompetitive profits following a predatory pricing scheme, the pro-
defendant rule which had been adopted by the Fourth Circuit below.
194
 
Nor did counsel argue that likelihood of recoupment should be the sole 
test of predatory pricing (a rule that would imply the alleged predator’s 
price-cost relationship is irrelevant), the “die-hard” Chicago position 
which had been adopted by the Seventh Circuit. The defense even 
acknowledged the continuing legal validity of Utah Pie, a case which Bork 
had once described as among the worst antitrust opinions ever written.
195
 
These concessions notwithstanding, the general thrust of the defendant’s 
arguments remained in keeping with the Chicago perspective, and many 
of the themes of Bork’s scholarly work were front and center in the de-
fendant’s brief. Although it never cited Bork’s work directly, many of the 
brief’s arguments unmistakably harkened to ideas that Bork had devel-
oped over the course of his scholarly career. Among these, the most rele-
vant was the brief’s repeated insistence that claims of “predatory pricing” 
were often attempts to thwart vigorous price competition, the very eco-
nomic activity that antitrust law was meant to protect. Thus, in most cas-
es, imposing liability for aggressive price cutting was a perversion of anti-
trust law itself. Citing Frank Easterbrook, the brief additionally warned 
that courts should be suspicious of any antitrust suit brought by a hori-
zontal competitor, arguing that “[t]he books are full of suits by rivals for 
the purpose, or with the effect, of reducing competition and increasing 
price.”
196
 In arguing that strict enforcement of the antitrust laws could ac-
tually reduce market competition, the defendant’s brief echoed a central 
theme of decades of Chicago scholarship. 
4. Amicus Curiae Briefs 
 Brooke Group featured four amicus briefs, each filed in support of the 
defendant. Two were filed by business firms with litigation interests simi-
lar to Brown & Williamson (in that they were past, current, and/or po-
tential defendants in predatory pricing cases), one was filed by the Gro-
cery Manufacturers of America, a trade group whose individual members 
had often been subject to predatory pricing litigation, and one was filed 
by The Business Roundtable (the “Roundtable”), an advocacy group 
 
Bork agreed: “I don’t think there is, Your Honor.” Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 189, at 25:18. 
194
See Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 341 
(4th Cir. 1992). 
195
Bork, supra note 1, at 210. 
196
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 48 n.37, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209 
(No. 92-466), 1992 WL 445371. 
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composed of CEOs of major American business corporations. Among 
these four briefs, the Roundtable’s is the most notable, as it represented 
a growing trend of amicus participation by nationwide lobbying organiza-
tions. Unlike each of the other three amici, which had more or less direct 
interests in the outcome of the litigation, the Rountable’s brief was in-
tended to exert a more general influence on the direction of antitrust 
law. In its brief, the Roundtable claimed to be neutral as between the 
parties, both large corporations: “[N]either party is a member,” it stated, 
“and The Business Roundtable has no special interest in the individual 
fortunes of either company.”
197
 However, the association did have “a criti-
cal interest in the standards that are applied to judge the legality of ag-
gressive competition in the marketplace.”
198
 Its efforts to promote this in-
terest at the Supreme Court were part of a larger historical pattern. 
Throughout the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, the submission of 
amicus briefs by conservative business and political groups (such as the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Enterprise Institute, the Pa-
cific Legal Foundation, and the Roundtable itself) became increasingly 
common. Today, these briefs have become a regular feature of Supreme 
Court antitrust cases, often presenting market-based arguments that par-
allel the holdings of the Court. 
As it happens, the Roundtable’s brief in Brooke Group was relatively 
thin on academic citations, though it did cite to Areeda’s work on preda-
tory pricing.
199
 The main thrust of the brief was a general warning that 
predatory pricing claims could chill legitimate price competition, togeth-
er with an admonition that subjective “intent” (i.e., intent to take market 
share from a rival) was an inappropriate grounds for antitrust liability.
200
 
Claiming that the Court’s decision would have effects “far beyond the 
case at hand,” the Roundtable predicted “a real risk that aggressive price 
competition in a large segment of the business world will be chilled” if 
the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
201
 Like defense counsel, the 
Roundtable cast the plaintiff’s case as an attempt to frustrate legitimate 
price competition, a familiar narrative in antitrust discourse by 1993. The 
Roundtable’s brief is therefore significant less for the originality of its ar-
gument than for presenting it on behalf of a powerful advocacy organiza-
tion claiming to speak for the larger business community. 
 In at least one respect, the amicus briefs in Brooke Group are also un-
representative of broader trends. Unusually for a case after the 1980s, 
 
197
Brief for The Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 16, Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 209 (No. 92-466), 1993 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 45. 
198
Id. at 1. 
199
See id. at 5, 12 n.5. 
200
Note that plaintiff’s counsel did not argue that intent alone could establish 
antitrust liability, despite the Roundtable’s focus on the issue. See id. 
201
Id. at 16. 
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Brooke Group featured no pro-plaintiff amici. Although pro-defendant 
amicus briefs outnumber pro-plaintiff briefs in many cases, the submis-
sion of pro-plaintiff amicus briefs by businesses, advocacy groups, and le-
gal and economic scholars had become a regular occurrence by the 
1990s. The high level of economic analysis which often characterizes such 
briefs speaks to the broader economization of antitrust law, and their ab-
sence from Brooke Group is therefore something of an anomaly.
202
 
5. Summary 
 Brooke Group is another useful example of historical changes in the 
antirust field. From a purely doctrinal perspective, the Brooke Group hold-
ing was far removed from earlier, interventionist pricing cases such as 
Utah Pie. More significant for purposes of this Article, however, was the 
convergence of plaintiff’s and defendant’s counsel on a shared intellec-
tual vison of antitrust—one in which consumer welfare is the dominant 
policy goal and economic analysis the dominant epistemological frame-
work. Although defendants had made little use of economics during the 
Warren Court era, and plaintiffs had been slow to adopt economic argu-
ments in the 1970s, modern antitrust has become defined by a universal 
embrace of the dismal science. The fact that in Brooke Group both plain-
tiff’s and defendant’s counsel were among the most eminent scholars in 
the field only reinforces the significance of the similarity of their ap-
proaches. Antitrust cases had once been argued in terms of fairness, op-
portunity, and independence. Brooke Group announced the ascendancy of 
the more limited ambitions of the modern era. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Having explored both quantitative and qualitative features of 60 
years of antitrust jurisprudence, I return now to the central question 
posed in the introduction: What explains the transition from antitrust in-
terventionism to the market-based economic approach that dominates 
antitrust today? Did law and economics scholarship convince the Court of 
the importance of economic analysis? Or, as the attitudinal model would 
suggest, was this transition determined primarily by the ideological views 
of conservative appointees? Given the possibility of mutual causality, are 
these factors necessarily distinct and separable? 
Based on the findings presented in this Article, my conclusion is 
that both factors played important roles in antitrust’s transformation, 
though the nature and mechanisms of their respective influences were 
very different. First and foremost, changes in the composition of the 
Court (and not changes in individual Justices’ views) were the most direct 
and most significant cause of changes in decision outcomes. The evi-
 
202
Of the 25 cases in the database decided between 1990 and 2010 (i.e., the final 
two decades), only three featured no pro-plaintiff amicus briefs. 
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dence on this point is clear. The switch from interventionist to market-
based decisions in the early 1970s closely corresponds with the establish-
ment of the Burger Court’s conservative voting bloc.
203
 Although the vot-
ing records of certain incumbent Justices (most notably Justice Brennan) 
did shift in a market-oriented direction over time, the effect of this shift 
was minor compared to the retirement of liberals such as Black, Douglas, 
and Warren and the appointment of conservatives such as Powell, Burg-
er, and Rehnquist. In fact, when viewed in terms of retirements and ap-
pointments, the reversal in antitrust decisions of the 1970s was as much a 
reflection of the pronounced liberalism of the Warren Court as it was of 
the conservatism of the Burger Court. The evidence regarding economic 
arguments tells a similar story. Individual voting data show that the Jus-
tices who responded most positively to economic arguments were the Jus-
tices who were already predisposed to casting market-based antitrust 
votes.
204
 Justices who were predisposed to casting interventionist votes, on 
the other hand (and with the exception of Justice Brennan), generally 
responded negatively to economic arguments.
205
 Together, these patterns 
indicate that when it comes to individual voting, preexisting political atti-
tudes are of greater importance than the parties’ arguments. This is fur-
ther illustrated by the specific example of Justice Powell, for whom aca-
demic scholarship was a means of justifying predetermined ends. For 
judges such as Powell, voting decisions in antitrust cases were shaped by 
deep-seated political attitudes regarding the role of business in American 
society and the proper scope of government regulation. The evidence 
suggests that these attitudes “primed” conservative Justices to be receptive 
to economic arguments. It does not suggest that economic arguments de-
termined their fundamental policy views. 
 If changes in antitrust law were primarily the result of changes in the 
membership of the Court, does it therefore follow that law and econom-
ics was irrelevant to the antitrust revolution? I would argue no—in fact, I 
believe that academic developments have been nearly as important as ju-
dicial appointments to antitrust’s transformation, though the mechanism 
of their influence is more difficult to specifically identify. Essentially, by 
altering the intellectual perspective of the broader antitrust community, 
the law and economics movement changed the premises upon which the 
entire field is based, with profound and lasting implications for the con-
tinuing development of the law. 
 The evidence of this change is the increasing acceptance of market-
based economic assumptions among intellectuals who had previously 
been guided by interventionist principles. Considering the cases dis-
cussed in this Article, Donald Turner’s role as amicus counsel in Sylvania 
 
203
See supra Figure 1. 
204
See supra Figure 10. 
205
Id. 
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is a prime example. As Assistant Attorney General for antitrust under 
President Johnson, Turner oversaw the case against Schwinn in 1967, 
which established the per se rule against vertical restraints. Only ten years 
later, Turner argued essentially the opposite position in Sylvania, citing 
many of the Chicago School’s economic criticisms of Schwinn. Even be-
fore Sylvania, moreover, the Harvard tradition of antitrust scholarship 
had begun to move in the direction of Chicago. In 1975, for example, 
Turner and Areeda had published their economic model of predatory 
pricing, which shared many of the Chicago School’s central analytical as-
sumptions.
206
 By the time that Areeda deployed this model as plaintiff’s 
counsel in Brooke Group, his economic analysis of predatory pricing was 
little different from Robert Bork’s. 
Turner and Areeda’s increasing affinity with the analytical approach 
of the Chicago School is only one of many historical examples of the 
growing influence of market-based antitrust.
207
 Richard Posner, a noted 
proponent of the Chicago approach and a central figure in the law and 
economics movement, began his career as an antitrust traditionalist. 
Working in the Office of the Solicitor General, Posner argued several 
government antitrust cases during the 1960s in which he advocated (and 
personally agreed with) the government’s interventionist legal theories—
before abruptly changing his antitrust views circa 1970.
208
 William F. Bax-
ter, Assistant Attorney General for antitrust under Reagan and commit-
ted supporter of market-based antitrust policy, also held interventionist 
antitrust views earlier in his career, which he explicitly recanted during 
the 1970s.
209
 Even the Chicago School’s founding intellectuals, including 
George Stigler, Ward Bowman, and Aaron Director himself, had at one 
time advocated breaking up large corporations.
210
 Within the academic 
 
206
See Areeda & Turner, supra note 175, at 697. 
207
Nearly 30 years ago, Richard Posner addressed the convergence of the 
Harvard and Chicago schools, writing that “the debate is no longer one between 
schools that employ consistently different and ideologically tinged premises to render 
predictably opposite results.” Posner, supra note 18 at 933–44. Marc Eisner suggests 
that this convergence has been to Harvard’s disadvantage, pointing out that “it is 
difficult to identify any concessions on the part of the Chicago school.” Eisner, supra 
note 3, at 111. 
208
See Stephen F. Ross, From Von’s to Schwinn to the Chicago School: Interview with 
Judge Richard Posner, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Antitrust, Spring 1992, at 4. 
209
See William F. Baxter, How Government Cases Get Selected—Comments from 
Academe, 46 Antitrust L.J. 586, 588 (1977). Baxter “recanted” earlier positions that 
he had endorsed in the 1967 Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust 
Policy (commonly referred to as the Neal Report), a special antitrust policy report 
commissioned by the Johnson administration which had made a number of 
interventionist policy recommendations. 115 Cong. Rec. 13890 (1969) (report of the 
White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy). 
210
A conversion narrative appears again and again in the intellectual history of 
the Chicago School. Robert Bork referred to his own studies under Director in 
religious terms: “A lot of us who took the antitrust course or the economics course 
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world, market-based antitrust theory has shown a remarkable power of 
persuasion, converting former skeptics and displacing the prior intellec-
tual mainstream. 
By influencing the study, teaching, and practice of antitrust law, 
these academic developments have had long-term policy implications. 
Today, most antitrust scholars agree that the jurisprudence of the War-
ren Court was economically naïve, that consumer welfare is (and should 
be) the primary goal of antitrust policy, and that economic analysis is in-
dispensable to the proper understanding of antitrust disputes—each 
principles attributable to law and economics scholarship. Even “post-
Chicago” scholars, who challenge the analytical models of the Chicago 
School, do so from a position of fundamental agreement with its focus on 
economic efficiency. For example, a recent text critical of the Chicago 
School nevertheless acknowledges that “U.S. antitrust enforcement, as a 
result of conservative economic analysis, is better today than it was during 
the Warren years—more rigorous, more reasonable, more sophisticated 
in terms of economics.”
211
 Given this broad normative consensus, it is dif-
ficult to study antitrust in a law school environment today without being 
deeply exposed to orthodox economic theory, the intellectual assump-
tions of which have achieved nearly hegemonic status. Given historical 
developments in legal education, it is hard to envision future Justices (or 
perhaps more importantly, their clerks) breaking from this economic 
paradigm to any significant degree. Although changes in antitrust origi-
nally resulted from the partisan cycle of judicial appointments, academic 
developments have ensured these changes are unlikely to be reversed. 
As a final note, it is also important to emphasize that the “legal” and 
“attitudinal” models are not the only explanations for changes in anti-
trust law. In addition to the jurisprudential developments discussed in 
this Article, changes in the cultural, political, and economic landscape 
have weakened the strength of antitrust as a populist force in American 
politics and greatly reduced public demand for vigorous antitrust en-
forcement.
212
 Although the court-centric evidence presented in this Arti-
cle does not speak directly to these broader changes, speculation as to 
their major causes may nevertheless be warranted. First, Americans may 
have simply grown accustomed to the presence of large, dominant firms 
 
underwent what can only be called a religious conversion. . . . We became janissaries 
as a result of this experience.” Panel Discussion, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of 
Law and Economics at Chicago, 26 J.L. & Econ. 163, 183 (1983). 
211
How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark, supra note 18, at 5. 
212
The decline of antitrust in American politics has been a long historical 
process, not limited to recent decades. Richard Hofstadter’s classic 1964 essay “What 
Happened to the Antitrust Movement?” shows that public interest in antitrust had 
been fading throughout the twentieth century. Hofstadter identifies antitrust as one 
of the “faded passions” of the populist reform movement. Richard Hofstadter, 
What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in The Paranoid Style in American 
Politics and Other Essays 188, 188–237 (2d prtg. 1966). 
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in many industries. High levels of industry concentration seem common-
place today (think communications, information technology, etc.), but 
represented unfamiliar and often frightening change early in the twenti-
eth century. Even as late as the 1960s, amidst growing acceptance of large 
corporations, consolidation in major industries continued to spark public 
concern.
213
 Second, the rise of international competition from countries 
such as Germany and Japan (and more recently China) seems to have 
reduced public interest in aggressive antitrust policy, in two ways: by 
providing new competitors in the domestic market and by rousing pro-
tectionist sentiment.
214
 In the context of economic globalization and the 
rise of international business, the American public has become less con-
cerned with limiting the size of domestic firms. Finally, the populist im-
pulses that originally gave rise to the earlier era of antitrust policy have 
taken new forms in the twenty-first century, adapting to the problems of 
the age. While economic populism remains a powerful force in American 
politics, it is today expressed primarily in terms of reducing wealth ine-
quality, achieving campaign finance reform, and punishing the financial 
industry, rather than the more traditional concerns of halting industrial 
concentration and protecting small businesses. Americans today seem 
largely indifferent toward the market dominance of many large corpora-
tions, and with the exception of the financial sector, there is little de-
 
213
For a mid-century perspective on Americans’ attitude toward large industrial 
firms, see generally id. For the classic historical examination of the rise of big 
business, see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial 
Revolution in American Business (15th prtg. 1999). 
214
The strength of this sentiment is reflected by the election of Donald Trump, 
who made criticizing U.S. trade policy a centerpiece of his presidential campaign. 
During his run for president, Trump threatened to penalize corporations that move 
production overseas, impose new trade barriers against China and Mexico, and 
renegotiate or “break” NAFTA. See Meghashyam Mali, Trump Threatens to ‘Break’ Trade 
Pact with Mexico, Canada, Hill: Ballot Box (Sept. 26, 2015, 8:30 AM), http:// 
thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/255053-trump-vows-to-renegotiate-or-break-trade-pact-
with-mexico-canada. At the time of this writing, it is difficult to predict what trade 
reforms the Trump administration will actually pursue, though early indications 
suggest President Trump will continue to take a hard stance on trade policy. See Tal 
Kopan, Trump Transition Memo: Trade Reform Begins Day 1, CNN (Nov. 16, 2016) 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/15/politics/donald-trump-trade-memo-transition/. Other 
presidential candidates—both Republican and Democrat—also criticized American 
trade policy as overly favorable to foreign nations. Most notably, left-wing populist 
Bernie Sanders committed to “[r]eversing trade policies like NAFTA, CAFTA, and 
PNTR with China that have driven down wages and caused the loss of millions of 
jobs.” Income and Wealth Inequality, BernieSanders.com, https://berniesanders.com/ 
issues/income-and-wealth-inequality (last visited Dec. 22, 2016). Even moderate 
Democrat Hillary Clinton felt compelled to renounce trade agreements such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, suggesting the strength of the American electorate’s 
concerns over global competition. 
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mand for breaking up big businesses.
215
 Whether these changes in Ameri-
can politics have influenced judicial decisions is difficult to say, but they 
have certainly reduced public pressure for antitrust legislation and en-
forcement. 
Despite—or perhaps because of—this loss of public interest, few ar-
eas of law have changed as profoundly as antitrust since World War II. 
Although much less dramatic in human terms, the changes in Supreme 
Court antitrust jurisprudence are comparable in scope to changes in civil 
rights, criminal justice, and personal privacy over the same time period. 
As discussed in this Article, the proximate cause of these far-reaching 
changes were the Nixon appointments of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
and the resulting shift in the attitudinal balance among the individual 
members of the Court. At the same time, however, developments in aca-
demic scholarship have transformed antitrust’s intellectual foundations, 
reducing the likelihood that these changes will be reversed, even in the 
case of future liberal appointments. This broader intellectual shift may 
ultimately prove the more significant of the two, as it has thoroughly—
and likely permanently—severed antitrust from its populist origins. 
Moreover, to the extent that antitrust is the prototypical example of the 
influence of law and economics, antitrust’s embrace of economic effi-
ciency over traditional notions of economic justice is emblematic of larg-
er developments in recent American legal history. 
 
215
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, dismantling large financial companies 
has becoming a rallying cry for many on the left (and some on the right). The 
campaign proposals of Bernie Sanders, for example, included a pledge of 
“[b]reaking up huge financial institutions so that they are no longer too big to fail.” 
Income and Wealth Inequality, supra note 214. However, even in Sanders’s highly 
populist presidential campaign, this pledge did not extend to firms outside the 
financial sector. 
